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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholar, and later Supreme Court Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. opened his great book, The Common Law, with a statement about how judges
go about deciding cases. He said,
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious,
even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men,
have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. 1
Forty years later, New York Court of Appeals Justice, and later Supreme Court
Justice, Benjamin Cardozo discussed with greater specificity how judges think
in The Nature of the Judicial Process. Cardozo said that judges tend to follow
the logic of existing precedents where that is reasonably possible, but then they
consider history, custom, and the welfare of society. 2 This topic about how
Professor of Law, University of the Pacific. McGeorge School of Law. A.B., 1946, University of Chicago: J.D., 1950, University of Chicago Law School; LL.M. 1966, Columbia Law
School: LL.D.. 1966, John Marshall Law School: J.S.D., 1968. Columbia Law School.
Spurgeon E. Bell Distinguished Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. B.A. 1976,
University of Chicago; J.D.. 1979. University of Wisconsin Law School.
I
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
2

BENJAMINN. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 30 31 (1921).
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judges do, and should, decide cases is one of perennial interest, and a number of
recent books have returned to the issue.
In one such book, How Judges Think, Seventh Circuit Judge, and prolific scholar, Richard Posner discusses how he and other judges that he knows go
about deciding cases.3 In a similar vein, Justice Antonin Scalia and legal scholar Bryan Garner discuss their views about how to persuade judges in The Art of
Persuading Judges. 4 In Courts & Congress: America's Unwritten Constitution,
Professor William Quirk discusses how courts have taken over deciding public
policy issues that he feels are more appropriately left to the other branches of
government, Congress, and the President. Thus, the American people are governed by an unwritten Constitution, which Quirk calls "The Happy Convention." 5 Contra the views of Quirk, in Retained by the People: The "Silent"
Ninth Amendment and the Constitutional Rights Americans Don't Know They
Have, Professor Daniel A. Farber argues that the Supreme Court should be more
vigorous than it is today, particularly in protecting individual rights from congressional or executive action through use of the mostly dormant, or "silent,"
Ninth Amendment. 6 Finally, in Originalism, Federalism, and the American
Constitutional Enterprise, Professor Edward A. Purcell, Jr. discusses the various
ways courts have dealt with questions of federalism and limits on federal governmental power.'
In this Article, we will consider each of these five recent statements on
the topic of judicial decision-making, placing the books into a broader context
of theories on judicial review. As noted in this review,' there are four basic
styles of judicial decision-making: (1) formalism (where literal text is given
great weight); (2) Holmesian (often characterized by deference to government
action and concern for underlying purposes of the law); (3) natural law (emphasis on judicial precedent and general principles underlying the law); and (4)
instrumentalism (great attention paid to alternative social policy consequences
of a decision). With regard to constitutional interpretation, formalist judges
focus on sources of meaning existing at the time of ratification - text, context,
and history - with particular focus on literal text. This leads to a static, or
fixed, view of the Constitution based on the textual meaning at the time of ratification. Holmesian judges add to these sources a judicial deference to legislative, executive, and, to some extent, social practice under the Constitution. Natural law judges add to these sources great respect for precedent and reasoned
3

RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008).

4

ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES

5

WILLIAM QUIRK, COURT & CONGRESS: AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION

6

DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE "SILENT" NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE

(2008).

2 (2008).
Quirk explains, "The new, unwritten constitution is called here the Happy Convention." Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON'T KNOW THEY HAVE (2007).
7
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007).
8
See infra notes 10 15. 19 30, 38-43 and accompanying text.
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elaboration of the law. Instrumentalist judges add a focus on prudential principles. For conservative instrumentalists, this typically involves greater weight
paid to prudential principles of judicial restraint; for liberal instrumentalists, this
typically involves greater weight paid to principles of justice or social policy
embedded in the law.
Comparing the five books mentioned above, it is clear that descriptions
and evaluations of what happens in judicial decision-making are influenced by
the observer's perspective on what style of deciding is preferred. Placed in this
perspective, each of these five books makes a good contribution to legal scholarship once the predisposition of the author is understood: Posner (conservative
instrumentalist); Justice Scalia (formalist); Professor Quirk (Holmesian); Professor Farber (natural law, with a hint of liberal instrumentalism); and Professor
Purcell (liberal instrumentalist). Because his book is in many ways the most
comprehensive of the five, and provides a good introductory overview of the
topic of judicial decision-making, Part II of this Article summarizes and reviews
Judge Posner's book, How Judges Think. Part III addresses the four other books
in the order mentioned above. Part IV provides a brief conclusion.
II.

JUDGE POSNER AND How JUDGES THINK

Judge Richard Posner's twenty-five years on the bench have produced
many creative and useful contributions in a wide variety of legal fields. 9 On the
topic of judicial decision-making, Judge Posner makes clear, in How Judges
Think, the complexity of his thought when deciding cases. At a minimum,
Posner advises that if a case is not controlled by precedent, an advocate appearing before him should identify the purpose behind the relevant legal principle,
and then show that the purpose would be fulfilled by a decision in favor of the
advocate's position.' 0 More broadly, he suggests from studying the literature
and observing the behavior of other judges that many of them think in a similar
way, which he calls "pragmatism," an approach that goes beyond rules, purpose,
principles, and precedent to emphasize the consequences of deciding a case one
way or another."1 Judge Posner concedes that there are some misguided judges,
which he identifies as "legalists."' 12 He says they behave in errant ways by giving too much weight to rules and precedents, and they fail to give enough

9

See generally Symposium, Commemorating Twenty-Five Years of Judge Richard Posner,

74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641 (2007).
10
POSNER, supra note 3, at 220.

1

See id. at 40 ("pragmatism" refers "to basing judgments (legal or otherwise) on conse-

quences, rather than on deduction from premises in the manner of syllogism"). id. at 238 ("The
core of legal pragmatism is pragmatic adjudication. and its core is heightened judicial concern for
consequences and thus a disposition to base policy judgments on them rather than on conceptual-

isms and generalities.").
12
Id. at 41-42.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112

weight to the consequences of alternative decisions. 13 That is the most important
consideration for4 pragmatists, other than possibly a soundly reasoned case directly on point.'
Along the way, Judge Posner recognizes two other groups of judges.
First, there are judges, like Justice Kennedy, who reason, as did Justice Powell
and Chief Justice John Marshall, that there are some overriding general principles to which current decisions should be related. 5 And then there are judges
who agree with legalists that law should be clear and certain, but who are willing to look behind rules to their reasons, as did Justice Holmes, and who, like
him, frequently defer to decisions of other branches or the states, as did Chief
Justice Rehnquist and is done by Chief Justice Roberts. 16 In addition, Judge
Posner tells us that most judging is "political," in the sense that it is not simply
the logical application of rules and precedents. 7 That is especially true in the
Supreme Court, he says, where arguments about the consequences of alternative
decisions are far more important than arguments based on rehearsing precedents.' 8 While discussing the Supreme Court as a political institution, Posner
submits that the Justices probably would not do a better job if they decided fewer cases. 19 He says that deciding cases is not a protracted process, unless the
judge has difficulty making up his mind, "which is a psychological trait rather
than an index of conscientiousness.,, 20 He notes that the decline in cases decided by the Court from 129 in 1958 to sixty-eight in 2006, "has coincided with
an increase in the quality and number of the Justices' law clerks [and] is a disturbing commentary on the effect of bureaucratization on productivity.", 2'
As noted, Posner acknowledges four different judicial decision-making
perspectives. 22 Not surprisingly, his major attention is focused predominantly
on the style of interpretation that he adopts, what he calls "pragmatism."
"Pragmatism" is a form of judicial decision-making also called "instrumentalism. ' '23 For such judges, the formulation and application of each rule is tested
13

Id. at 42.

14

Id. at 239-40.

15

Id. at 310 11. For discussion of Justice Kennedy's decision-making style, see notes 93 133

and accompanying text.
16

POSNER,

supra note 3, at 287-88.

For discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Chief

Justice Roberts' decision-making style, see notes 75 92 and accompanying text.
17
Id. at 9-10.
18

Id. at 269.

19

Id. at 269-70.

20

Id. at 299.

21

Id.

22

See notes 10-1 6 and accompanying text.

23

See generally CHARLES D. KELSO & R. RANDALL KELSO, THE PATH OF CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 11, 342-43 (2007) (an E-Book available at www.vandeplaspublishing.com); David Lyons,
Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism
A PathologicalStudy, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 949, 956
(1981); Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth-Century American Legal
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by its purpose and effects. These judges are willing to engage in a broad-based
historical investigation to help determine overall context and purposes. They
believe that courts should seek to advance sound social policies where leeways
exist in the law, and give less regard to precedent than to reaching sound resuIts. 24 On the current Court, Justice Stevens inclines to this view, as do Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, and newly confirmed Justice Sonia Sotomayor; past
champions of this view include Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justices Douglas,
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.2 5 While such instrumentalists on the Supreme Court have all been more or less liberal in their approach to policy questions, Judge Posner provides a good reminder of the possibility that a conservative law-and-economics approach may be a version of pragmatic instrumentalism.,,
"Legalists," as described by Posner, are more commonly described as
"formalists., ' 21 Such judges emphasize the literal, plain meaning of words.
They prefer clear, bright-line rules which are capable of formal, logical, and
predictable application. When using history as an aid, they search for the specific historical views of the framers and ratifiers on specific issues, and refuse to
speculate on what history may suggest about broader concepts. 28 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito tend to approach constitutional and statutory interpretation cases from this perspective.29
The two other styles of interpretation, which Posner acknowledges but
does not• develop
•
30in his book, are Holmesian decision-making and natural law
decision-making.
One set of judges, following Justice Holmes, agree with
formalists that the law should be clear and predictable. But they emphasize the
need for judicial restraint and deference to the legislature and the executive, as
Thought A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 861 (1981).
24
See generally KELSO & KELSO. supra note 23, at 11 13. 47 54, 325 53 (citing GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 86 98 (1977): KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 213 35 (1960): Karl Llewellyn, On the Current Recapture of the
Grand Tradition, in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM INTHEORY AND PRACTICE 215, 217 (1962)).
25
See KELSO & KELSO. supra note 23. at 325 53. 1628 (discussing all of these Justices).
26

Id. at 341-43. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1984);

RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); Ernest A. Young, Conservative Judicial

Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139 1416 (2002).
27

See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 12.

28

Id. at 35-41, 278 302 (citing Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 527

942 (1999); Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908)): Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509 (1988).
29
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23. at 41 47, 278 302. 1626 28 (citing ANTONIN SCALIA.
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997) [hereinafter INTERPRETATION]: Beau James Brock, Mr.
Justice Antonin Scalia: A Renaissance of Positivism and Predictabilityin ConstitutionalAdjudication, 51 LA. L. REV. 623, 634-49 (1991); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989)).
3o
POSNER. supra note 3, at 232 35.
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well as deference to states. Although they consider the literal meaning of
words, as do formalists, they are willing to look beyond the words, and pragmatically consider general purposes because,S as,,31Holmes said, "The life of the law
has not been logic; it has been experience.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions embodied this Holmesian style, as do the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts.3

The judicial decision-making style with the oldest pedigree is that of
natural law. These judges endeavor to connect specific decisions and doctrines
with general principles of law, in what is called "reasoned elaboration of the
law." Words in the Constitution that are judged to reflect the adoption of broad
principles, such as federalism or the separation of powers, are interpreted in
light of those principles. There is an effort to develop a reasoned elaboration of
law in light of its purposes and history. In doing so, such judges pay great respect tosameintepretve
prior precedents•33
of earlier judges, particularly those engaged in the
same interpretive enterprise. Chief Justice John Marshall so reasoned. In recent times, his major heirs have been Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor.34
In addition to his discussion of these various styles of decision-making,
Judge Posner uses his central focus on how judges think as a springboard to
provide information and views on a wide variety of topics which, in one way or
another, bear some relation to judicial thought. For example, we learn that
judges are busy but that most opinions are drafted by law clerks, who are more
legalistic than the judges who decide the cases.35 We also learn his view that
law professors are not currently teaching what is most useful for lawyers to
know about persuading judges. 6 This may be explained by the fact, he says,
that law professors are tending more and more to be subject matter specialists

31

See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 41-46, 303-24 (citing OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE

COMMON LAW 1 (1881); Robert W. Gordon, Holmes'Common Law as Legal and Social Science,
10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 719, 722-23 (1982); Patrick J. Kelley, Was Holmes a Pragmatist? Reflections on a New Twist to an Old Argument, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 427. 456 (1990); Yosal Rogat. Mr.
Justice Holmes: A DissentingOpinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 254 (1963):; G. Edward White, The Integrity of Holmes'Jurisprudence.10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 633, 655, 667 (1982)).
32
See infra notes 75-90 and accompanying text. See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note
23, at 303 24. 1621 26.
33
See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 54-62, 354-93 (citing Edward S. Corwin,
The "Higher Law" Background of American ConstitutionalLaw (pts. I & 3), 42 HARV. L. REV.
149, 365 (1928-29); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 277 (1985); David M. O'Brien, The Framers' Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court,
and Pragmatic ConstitutionalInterpretivism, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 119 (1991); H. Jefferson Powell. The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985)).
34
See infra notes 93-136 and accompanying text. See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note
23, at 354 56. 393-404.
35
POSNER, supra note 3, at 221.
36
Id. at 215 19.
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and, in the process, are Snot 37teaching the kind of information and skills generally
needed to persuade judges.
Similar insightful conclusions are sprinkled throughout the book. It
would detract from some readers' enjoyment of the book to attempt to list them
all. But here is a sample, drawn from a Chapter on the Supreme Court:
* "Against the decision in Brown it could be argued, first, that if
instead of forbidding public school segregation the Court had
insisted that states practicing segregation spend as much money
per black as per white pupil, the expense of maintaining parallel
public school systems might have forced integration more rapidly than the Court's actual decision, which was not fully implemented for decades. 38
*

"If the Justices acknowledged to themselves the essentially

personal, subjective, political, and, from a legalist standpoint,
arbitrary character of most of their constitutional decisions, then
- deprived of 'the law made me do it' rationalization for their
exercise of power - they might be less aggressive upsetters of
political applecarts than they are." 39
* "Maybe when all the characteristics of the Court as an institution are considered - especially the fact that the Justices try to
justify their decisions in reasoned opinions, which, even when
they are advocacy products largely drafted by law clerks wet
behind the ears, reflect a degree of deliberation and a commitment to minimal coherence that are not demanded of legislative
bodies - the correct conclusion is that the Justices'
legislative
' 40
discretion is really rather narrowly channeled. ,
*

Speaking of Justice Breyer's book Active Liberty (2005),

Judge Posner says that, "A Supreme Court Justice writing about
constitutional law theory is like a dog walking on his hind legs;
the wonder is not that it is done well but that it is done at all.'
* "What reins in the Justices is... an awareness, conscious or
unconscious, that they cannot go 'too far' without inviting reprisals by the other branches of government spurred on by an
37
8

40
41

Id. at 216-21.
ld.at 280.

Id. at 289.
Id.at 304-305.
Id. at 324.
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indignant public. So they pull their punches, giving just enough
obeisance to precedent to be able to present themselves as 'real'
judges, rather than as the more than occasional legislators that
they really are." 42
This having been said, a more complete book on the nature of the judicial process would have to account fully for all four of the judicial decisionmaking styles that Posner identifies, and how they differ in terms of their approach to common-law decision-making, such as in contracts and torts cases;
statutory interpretation; and constitutional law decision-making. While a good
account of a pragmatic approach to judicial decision-making, Judge Posner's
book does not meet this broader goal. Had he undertaken that inquiry, his book
would have considered in greater depth the various sources of interpretation
used most prominently by formalist, Holmesian, natural law, and instrumentalist
judicial actors. 43
With regard to constitutional interpretation, such a detailed description
of constitutional interpretation would note that any interpreter must consider a
wide variety of possibly relevant considerations that will be given different
weight by each of the four styles of decision-making. These considerations, or
sources of constitutional meaning, can be described as follows:
(1) The literal, or plain, meaning of the Constitution's text; and
the text's purpose or spirit;
(2) The context of that text, including verbal or policy maxims
of construction; related provisions in the Constitution or other
related documents, like the earlier enacted Articles of Confederation; and the structure of government contemplated by the
Constitution, including issues of federalism and separation of
powers;
(3) Historical evidence concerning the intent of the framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution, both specific historical evidence,
like Notes of the Constitutional Convention or The Federalist
Papers, and general background historical evidence, viewed
both from the perspective of specific historical intent of the
framers and ratifiers and any general aspirations or general intent the framers and ratifiers may have had in mind;
42

Id. at 375.

43

On this broader topic, see generally R. RANDALL KELSO & CHARLES D. KELSO, STUDYING

LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (1984) (discussing common-law, statutory, and constitutional decisionmaking from formalist. Holmesian. natural law, and instrumentalist perspectives) KELSO &
KELSO. supra note 23, at 35 62 (summarizing common-law, statutory. and constitutional decision-making from formalist, Holmesian. natural law, and instrumentalist perspectives).
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(4) Legislative, executive, and social practice under the Constitution;
(5) Judicial precedent interpreting the Constitution; and
(6) Prudential arguments concerning the consequences of a particular judicial decision, both from the perspective of text, context, history, practice, and precedent, and whether that decision
would advance a particular background principle of justice or
social policy that the judge believes is embedded in the Constitution or constitutional doctrine (more succinctly phrased as
"embedded in the law"), or perhaps a principle of justice or social policy that is "not so embedded" in the Constitution or existing constitutional doctrine.
These sources can be organized under two broad headings: contemporaneous sources of meaning and subsequent considerations. Contemporaneous
sources are those that existed at the time a constitutional provision was ratified.
They include the text of the Constitution; the context of that text, including verbal and policy maxims of construction; related provisions in the Constitution or
other related documents; the structure of government contemplated by the Constitution (structural arguments of federalism and separation of powers); and the
history surrounding the provision's drafting and ratification. Subsequent considerations involve matters that occur after the constitutional provision is ratified. These include the sub-categories of (a) subsequent events, which involve
legislative, executive, and social practice under the Constitution, and judicial
precedent interpreting the Constitution; and (b) prudential considerations, which
involve judicial consideration of the consequences of any judicial construction,
including arguments of justice or social policy.
These sources can be organized by resorting to whether they involve
relatively specific and limited interpretive tasks or resorting to more general
kinds of reasoning. Table I may clarify these various sources of interpretation.44

44

A complete discussion of these sources of constitutional interpretation and their use appears
at KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 99-133 (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
297 U.S. 288 (1936)). See also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) (similar discussion of text, structure. history. doctrinal.

prudential. and ethical considerations in constitutional interpretation).
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Table 1
Sources of Constitutional Meaning

Contemporaneous Sources
Text
Context
History

Subsequent Considerations
Practice
Precedent
Prudential
Considerations

More Specific Interpretive Tasks

General Kinds of Reasoning

Literal or Plain Meaning of Text
Verbal Maxims
Related Provisions
Specific Historical Evidence
(1) Specific Historical Intent
(2) General Historical Intent

Purpose or Spirit of Text
Policy Maxims
Structural Arguments
General Historical Evidence
(1) Specific Historical Intent
(2) General Historical Intent

Legislative or Executive Practice
Social Practice
Core Holdings of Precedent
Reasoned Elaboration of Law
Judicial Restraint Considerations
Other Prudential Concerns
(Ia) Text (e.g., prudential principles
(2) Practice & Precedent;
of standing, ripeness, mootness)
(3) Principles of Justice and/
(Ib) Context/Structure (e.g., political
or Social Policy Embedded
questions and Ashiiander factors
in the Law(Ic) Purpose/History
(4) Justice and/or Social
(e.g., sensitivity to the needs of government)Policy Not So Embedded

In general, formalists/legalists focus on contemporaneous sources of
meaning, particularly literal text, which leads to a static, or fixed, view of the
Constitution based on the textual meaning at the time of ratification. 45 Holmesian judges add to contemporaneous sources a judicial deference to later legislative, executive, and, to some extent, social practice. 46 Natural law judges add to
these sources great respect for precedent and reasoned elaboration of the law. 4
Instrumentalist judges add a focus on prudential principles. For conservative
instrumentalists, this typically involves greater weight paid to prudential principles of judicial restraint; for liberal instrumentalists, this typically involves

See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23. at 278 302 (citing INTERPRETATION. supra note 29. at
44 (the alternative view of "The Living Constitution," which changes meaning based on later
legislative, executive, or social practice; or later judicial precedents; or prudential considerations,
is incompatible with the "antievolutionary purpose of a constitution")).
46
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 303 24 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
45

75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (our tradition derives from both "our people and our
laws."); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976);
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 129, 144 (1893)).
47
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 325-53 (citing H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 887-902 (1985); David M. O'Brien, The
Framers' Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court, and Pragmatic Constitutional Jnterpretivism, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 145 (1991) ("'[A]mong the obvious and just guides applicable to
[interpreting] the Const[itutio]n.' Madison listed: '1. The evils [and] defects for curing which the
Constitution was called for & introduced. 2. The comments prevailing at the time it was adopted.
3. The early, deliberate, and continued practice under the Constitution ....
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greater weight paid to principles of justice or social policy embedded in the
law. 48 These predispositions are reflected in the following Table:
Table 2
Sources of Constitutional Meaning and Styles of Interpretation
Interpretation
Style

Main Focus of
Interpretation Style

Formalism

Contemporaneous Sources
Text
Literal or Plain Meaning of Text
Context
Verbal Maxims
Related Provisions
History
Specific Historical Evidence
(1) Specific Historical Intent

More Specific
Interpretive Tasks

General Kinds of Reasoning

(2) General Historical Intent

Purpose or Spirit of Text
Policy Maxims
Structural Arguments
General Historical Evidence
(1) Specific Historical Intent

(2) General Historical Intent

Subsequent Considerations
Holmesian
Natural Law
Instrumentalism

Practice

Legislative or Executive Practice Social Practice

Precedent
Prudential

Core Holdings of Precedent
Consequences Evaluated in

Considerations

light of Text, Context/Structure, light of Practice and Precedent;
and Purpose/History, mostly
focused on Judicial Restraint

Reasoned Elaboration of Law
Consequences Evaluated in
background Principles of Justice
and/or Social Policy Embedded

in the Law; or Not So Embedded

A third way to think about the four judicial decision-making styles is to
note that, jurisprudentially, there are two main questions that lie behind any act
of judicial interpretation. The first concerns the nature of law, and the second
concerns the nature of the judicial task. Concerning the nature of law, two main
approaches have appeared in jurisprudential writings. Under one approach, law
is seen as primarily a set of rules and principles whose application is guided by
48

See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 354-404. A complete discussion of these predisposi-

tions of the four judicial decision-making styles appears at id. at 134 72. Note that while conservative instrumentalists may share with Holmesian judges a policy ofjudicial restraint and deference to government, a conservative formalist will be driven more by the formalist focus on literal
text and historical meaning at the time of ratification, not judicial deference or restraint. Thus,
formalist judges do not necessarily have a policy of judicial restraint. As has been noted about
formalist Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justices Scalia and Thomas have voted to strike down federal affirmative action provisions, state affirmative action plans, measures designed to promote
minority ownership of media, campaign finance legislation that attempts to redress wealth inequities in the political process, portions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, part of the Family and
Medical Leave Act, legislative attempts to promote minority representation, laws protecting women from violence, and laws protecting gays. the aged, and the disabled from discrimination. They
have found constitutional violations in the actions of local communities seeking to protect their
citizens from flooding, congestion, and environmental damage. They have even argued that the
efforts of all fifty states to fund legal services for the poor by using the interest from a pooled
account of lawyers' trust funds which could not earn interest for their owners, was nevertheless an
unconstitutional taking even though the owners suffered no economic loss. See also William P.
Marshall, The JudicialNomination Wars, 39 U. RiCH. L. REv. 819, 827 28 (2005). In a number of
these cases, including campaign finance litigation, Chief Justice Rehnquist. from his more Holmesian perspective, has voted to uphold the law.
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an analytic methodology of logic and reason. This has been called the analytic,
or conceptualist, approach. Alternatively, law can be seen as ultimately to be
judged, not in terms of logical consistency, but as a means to some social end
through a pragmatic or functional treatment of rules and principles. This has
been called the functional, or pragmatic, approach. The second main question
any judge must ask before deciding how to resolve a legal dispute is whether
judicial decision-making should be separable from morals or social values, i.e.,
should judges view law solely as a body of rules and principles from which legal conclusions are derived - the positivist assumption - or should judges
view law as a body of rules and principles testable by reference to some external
standard of rightness, some social or moral value - law as normative or prescriptive, not descriptive. Combining the two different views on the nature of
law (analytic versus functional) and the nature of the judicial task (positivist
versus normative) results in the four decision-making styles, as indicated in Table 3:
Table 3
Styles of Judicial Decision-Makin2
Nature of Judicial Task 4

Nature of Law
Law as Logical;
Analytic or
Conceptualist Attitude;
Law as Library Science
Law as Means to Ends;
Functional or
Pragmatic Approach;
Law as Empirical Science

Positivism:

Normativism:

Judges as Neutral
Declarers of the Law

Judges as
Normative Actors

Formalism/
Analytic Positivism

Natural Law

Holmesian/
Functional Positivism

Instrumentalism

Often judges who adopt the positivist assumption of the judicial role believe that law is a science to be governed by the analytic methodology of logic
and reason. These are the formalists. In contrast, many judges who adopt the
normative view of the judicial role believe that law is to be judged in practical
terms as a means to advance that normative end. These are the instrumentalists.
Formalism and instrumentalism, thus, tend to be the two decision-making styles
that judges, and commentators, focus on most. As Table 3 indicates, however, a
complete typography of judicial decision-making styles must take Holmesian
and natural law decision-making into account.49
This typography of judicial decision-making styles can help organize
and critique the other books on judicial review. We turn next to that task.

Full discussion of this point appears in KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, Ch. 2 3; R. Randall
Kelso. Separation of Powers Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and Four Doctrinal Ap49

proaches to JudicialDecision-Making.20 PEPP. L. REv. 531. 534 52 (1992).
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III. THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO JUDICIAL REVIEW ON
CRITIQUES OF MODERN COURTS

A.

Justice Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garnerand the Four Decision-Making
Styles

In The Art of Persuading Judges,50 Justice Antonin Scalia and legal author Bryan A. Garner have written an interesting and informative book about the
art of persuading judges. Following their own advice to be clear, use informative headings, and make it interesting, the co-authors of this concise treatise
describe precisely what to aim for when attempting to persuade a judge and how
to get there. Brief enough to be read in a few hours, the book can usefully rest
at hand when a lawyer is preparing written submissions or readying for oral
argument.
Lawyers who are called upon to engage in the art of persuasion will find
the book an interesting read and a useful source to consult. The advice has a
common-sense quality to it, and, of course, Justice Scalia has had many years to
observe the process up close and personal. His co-author, Bryan Garner, has
studied and taught advocacy to lawyers for many years. Their combination is a
high-powered source of well-crafted ideas.
The major drawback of the book is that the authors discuss only two
styles of judicial decision-making, not the four discussed in Part II, and thus
their discussion is incomplete. Several times in the book, the co-authors refer to
the source of legal decision-making as one or the other of two forces, which
they describe as "textualism" (the formalist/legalist model discussed in Part II)
versus "purposivism" (the instrumentalist model discussed in Part II). However,
as discussed in Part II, there are four basic judicial decision-making styles of
which an advocate must be aware - the two Scalia and Garner mention, textualism/formalism and purposivism/instrumentalism, and two others, Holmesian
decision-making and natural law. 51 A complete analysis of the art of persuading
judges must take all four judicial decision-making styles into account.
Before addressing this aspect of the book, it must be noted that most of
the effective advocacy points made by Scalia and Garner apply to any judicial
decision-making style. The book first explains general principles of argumentation and legal reasoning that apply to briefs and oral argument. Regarding
briefs, the book covers preparatory steps, the writing process, brief architecture
and strategy, and writing style.52 For oral argument, the analysis is more detailed, covering long-term preparation, deciding who will argue, early prepara50

SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4.

Antonin Scalia is an Associate Justice, United States

Supreme Court. Bryan Garner is author of Garner's Modern American Usage (2003) and The
Elements of Legal Style (2002) and Editor in Chief of Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004);
Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999).
51 See supra notes 22-32, 43-48 and accompanying text.
52 SCALIA& GARNER, supra note 4. at 5 136, 137 206 (oral arguments).
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tion, readying yourself for oral argument, the substance and manner of an oral
argument, handling questions, and behavior after the argument. Again following
their own advice, the co-authors throughout have used informational headings to
make clear the ideas which are to come.
The twenty-one items of advice on general principles of argumentation
cannot be compressed without losing some of their flavor. But, overall, there is
a call for understanding (the case, the jurisdiction, the judge, and the adversary's
case); for accuracy, brevity, and clarity; for logical presentation (best argument
first, issues before facts, appeal to rules, justice, and common sense, closing
with what the court should do); and for avoiding distractions (overstating the
case or making an overt appeal to emotions).5 3 Advice on legal reasoning is
dealt with more concisely. The authors recommend to find a rule that works
together logically with the facts of the case. Look for it in legislation or case
law. Always begin your presentation with the words of authoritative texts. Be
prepared to use rules of interpretation and/or legislative history. Try to find an
explicit statement of your major premise in governing or persuasive cases. 54
Advice on briefing is provided in twenty-seven suggestions, beginning
with the idea that the purpose of a brief is to bring out your theory of the case
and your main themes in order to make it easier for the court to decide as you
wish. Being able to craft such a document begins much earlier by developing an
appealing style and a broad vocabulary through widespread reading of good
55
prose.
The book also notes that a brief should be written from an outline and
repeatedly revised. The format and structure should follow the rules of the court
and local practice. The most important single part is often a statement of the
questions presented in such form as to suggest an answer favoring your case.
On writing style, the authors say to value clarity above all other elements. Section headings should be informative. Use scrupulous accuracy when dealing
with authorities. And there are a number of things to be avoided, such as jargon, needless Latin, acronyms, and poor typography.56
Garner advises to put no substantive point in a footnote 7 Scalia, qualifying, says if the court is accustomed to issuing detailed opinions, some unimportant matters can be discussed below the text.58 Again, Garner advises to put
nothing in a footnote beyond what might be consulted in looking up a refer-

53

Id. at 1 38.

54

57

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

58

Id. at 130.

55
56

39-55.
57 136.

107 36.
129.
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ence. 5 9 Scalia prefers to have full citations in the text because judges are famili60
ar with that technique and many are uncomfortable with change.
The authors devote sixty-three items to oral argument, assuming that
many judges who are undecided at the time of argument may be led to a decision by the information and perspectives it provides, particularly the opportunity
for questions to be asked and answered. An oral argument begins long before
arriving in court, they say, by preparations for public speaking and choosing the
skilled advocate most familiar with the case. During weeks before the argument, the advocate should learn the case quite well and have a clear theory of
the case and the judicial mandate that is sought. Moot courts should be conducted. On the eve of argument, check authorities for late developments. 61
Be properly attired, the authors state, and arrive in court early with all
your materials. Approach the lectern unencumbered and make eye contact with
the court, providing a customary greeting and introducing yourself, if necessary.
Have your opening remarks "down pat." Lead with your strongest argument.62 If
you have nothing useful left to say, conclude even though you have time left.
As to the manner of delivery, the authors say, flatly, that the argument
should never be read and is better delivered if not memorized except, perhaps,
the opener and the closer. Present the argument as if it were the truth rather than
your opinion. Avoid distracting habits such as chewing your fingernails. Questions should be welcomed. If you do not fully understand a question, ask for
clarification. If you do not know, say so. Try to begin with a "yes" or "no," and
then explain or qualify. Try to recognize when a judge has asked you a friendly
63
question. Beware of conceding anything.
After the argument, advise the court of any significant new authorities.
Evaluate your performance in an effort to learn from any mistakes and help
64
yourself toward building a reputation for excellence in the art of advocacy.
The book concludes by suggesting that you not consider each case in isolation
but, rather, as a platform from which to build on your successes. They say,
"Argue not just for the day but for reputation. 65
As indicated above, 66 several times in the book the co-authors refer to
the source of legal decision-making as one or the other of two forces. For example, early in the book there is a reference to stare decisis as compared with a
drive toward fairness to litigants, socially desirable results in the case at hand,
and the adoption of a rule that will produce fairness, socially desirable results,
59
60
61

Id. at 132.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 137-60.

63

Id. at 173.
Id. at 178 200.

64

Id. at 206.

65

Id.

66

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

62
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and
predictability in future cases. 67 Again, a page later, a dichotomy is presented:
Some judges believe that their duty is quite simply to give the
text its most natural meaning - in the context of related provisions, of course, and applying the usual canons of textual interpretation - without assessing the desirability of the consequences that meaning produces. At the other extreme are those
judges who believe it their duty to give the text whatever permissible meaning will produce the most desirable results.68
In discussing judicial philosophy - what it is that leads judges to draw
conclusions - the options suggested are "Primarily text, or primarily policy?"
or "Is the judge strict or lax on stare decisis? Does the judge love or abhor references to legislative history?, ' 69 Later, there is a reference to "textualists" relying on the words of a statute and "purposivists" gravitating in another direction.7 °
"Textualists," as described by Scalia and Garner, are more commonly
described as "formalists."' 71 "Purposivists," as described by Scalia and Garner,
are more commonly identified as "instrumentalists. 7 2 As discussed in Part II,
two additional styles beyond those identified by Scalia and Garner need to be
considered by modern advocates: Holmesian decision-making, with its focus on
deference to legislative and executive action; 73 and natural law decision-making,
with its focus on precedent and reasoned elaboration of the law.74
Bearing in mind that arguments need to be addressed to all the styles
likely to have some influence on the decision of a judge or judges, an advocate
needs to go beyond the textualist/formalist and purposive/instrumentalist styles
of interpretation. To help Holmesian judges reach decisions, advocates should
indicate why deference should or should not be given to decisions of other
branches of government, or by individuals as a matter of deference to social
practice. To help modern natural law judges reach a favorable decision, an effort needs to be made to connect arguments to a reasoned elaboration of general
principles of law and to pay great respect to existing judicial precedents.

67

SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, at xxi.

68
69

Id. at xxii.
Id. at 5.

70

Id. at51.

71

See generally supra notes 27 29 and accompanying text.

72

See generally supra notes 23 26 and accompanying text.

73

See generally supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
See generally supra notes 33 34 and accompanying text.

74
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With respect to the Holmesian style of deciding cases, there are many
examples in the opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist. The late Chief Justice

wrote for the Court in a number of cases wherein a key factor was the wisdom,
as he saw it, of deferring to actions by another branch of government. This list
of such cases is long. 75 Only a sample is covered here.
In Rostker v. Goldberg,7 6 the Court upheld draft registration limited to
7
males. Men subject to the draft claimed a violation of the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized
the customary deference accorded the judgments of Congress, especially to legislative judgments in the area of military affairs, an area in which the Court has
admitted a relative lack of judicial competence. Further, in view of Congress's
extended deliberations, the exemption of women from registration was not an
accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about women, but
a con78
sidered judgment to which judicial deference was appropriately applied.
In Sosna v. Iowa,79 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court in
upholding a one-year durational residence requirement for obtaining a divorce
in Iowa. Refusing to apply the strict scrutiny called for by dissenting instrumentalist Justices Marshall and Brennan, Justice Rehnquist said that the state had
made precisely the sort of determination that a state is entitled to make, in that it
had not only effectuated state substantive policy calling for more than a constitutional minimum of connection with the state, but also provided a greater safeguard against successful collateral attack than would a requirement of nothing
more than bona fide residence.8 °

75

An overview of Chief Justice Rehnquist's Holmesian style of decision-making appears at
KELSO & KELSO. supra note 23. at 303 24. Of course, this observation does not mean that Chief
Justice Rehnquist, or his successor Chief Justice Roberts, who also tends to follow a Holmesian
style of decision-making (see infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text) will defer to the government in every case. Sometimes government action is clearly unconstitutional. Even in that case,
however, the doctrine, as propounded by a Holmesian, tends to be as limited as possible in its
application. For example, in United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote for the Court striking down Congress's attempt to use the Commerce Clause to regulate all
guns around schools. Under the doctrine as phrased in Lopez, Congress can regulate. and does
regulate today, guns around schools as long as the gun has moved in interstate commerce, which
is true for most guns, since most guns are not manufactured, sold, and possessed in one state only.
Similarly, in United States v. Alforrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for
the Court striking down Congress's attempt to use the Commerce Clause to make constitutional
the Violence Against Women Act, later congressional statutes regulating various kinds of violent
activity, such as Hate Crimes statutes, or the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, still remain active
on the statute books today.
76

453 U.S. 57, 78-83 (1981).

77
78

Id. at 83.
Id. at 80 82.

79

419 U.S. 393, 410-14 (1975); Id. at 418 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).

80

Id. at 408-09.
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In Sandin v. Conner,81 Rehnquist wrote for the Court in abandoning a
rule that defined a prisoner's protected liberty interests on the basis of whether
there was mandatory language in the text of prison regulations.8 2 The Chief
Justice replaced that rule with the test of whether the prison has imposed atypical and significant hardship on an inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.8 3 This rule clearly gives prison authorities more discretion than did
the previous rule, at least where there are written prison regulations.
Chief Justice Roberts appears to closely resemble Chief Justice Rehnquist in that he also approaches cases from the Holmesian model of interpretation. Many of his decisions while on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals suggest
that approach. 8 4 Examples also appear in his opinions as Chief Justice of the
85
United States Supreme Court. For example, in Morse v. Frederick,
Chief Justice Roberts deferred to the judgments of a school's principal. In Morse, the
Court upheld sanctioning a student who, at a school-sanctioned and supervised
event, held up a banner saying "BONG HITS 4 JESUS." '
Stating that Congress has declared that part of a school's job is educating students about the
dangers of illegal drug use and that school principals have a difficult and vitally
important job, the Chief Justice concluded that the principal could reasonably
have found that the banner constituted promotion of illegal drug use in violation
of established school policy. This was enough to permit school regulation under
deferential rational basis review. The Chief Justice added that the First
Amendment does not require schools to tolerate student expression at school
events that contributes to the dangers of illegal drug use. 87 Reflecting a perspective not as deferential to schools, Justice Kennedy joined with Justice Alito in a
concurrence that focused more on reasoned elaboration of free speech doctrine.88 They noted that if the speech were not connected to the schoolsanctioned event, and was student-generated speech, then the intermediate standard of review of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
would apply, even if the speech conflicted with the educational mission of the
school.89

s

515 U.S. 472. 477 87 (1995).

82

83

Id. at 474-75.
Id. at 484.

84

See generally KELSO & KELSO. supra note 23, at 1620 26.

85

551 U.S. 393, 401-10 (2007).

86

87

Id. at 397.
Id.at 403.

88

Id.at 422-25. (Alito, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring).

89 Id. (Alito, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
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In Runsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.,90
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, upholding the Solomon
Amendment. That Act cut off federal funds to institutions that deny military
recruiters access equal to that provided by the institution to any other employer. 91 Deferring to judgments of the legislative branch, the Chief Justice said that
Congress could have ordered schools to accept military recruiters and so could
also accomplish that result by conditions on spending. The Act did not violate
the plaintiff law schools' freedom of speech, said the Chief Justice, because the
schools need not say anything; they need not agree with any speech of recruiters; and they are not restricted in what they may say about the military's poli-

cies.92
Almost all of Justice Kennedy's opinions, as a modern natural law
judge, make an effort to connect his reasoning with some general principles of
constitutional law, such as the separation of powers or the need to protect liberty. In order to help Justice Kennedy decide a close case, an advocate would be
well advised to seek such connections because Kennedy's view prevailed in all
twenty-five of the 5-4 cases decided in the 2006 Term of the Court, and he remains the key swing vote on the Court today. 93 There follows a few examples
of how Justice Kennedy's reasoning differs somewhat from that of his formalist,
Holmesian, or instrumentalist colleagues.
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 94 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
said that Congress could not create standing in "any person" to bring an action
to enjoin any government instrumentality alleged to be in violation of the Endangered Species Act. 95 Scalia said the literal text of the Constitution provides
that it is the President's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. '96 Rejecting such literalism and adopting a view consistent with precedents, Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Souter,
said that Congress could identify an injury it seeks to vindicate and relate that
injury to a class of persons entitled to bring suit. 97 But he agreed with Justice
Scalia that the individuals had to establish a clear injury in fact. If a suit were
allowed without requiring concrete injury, the vitality of the adversarial process
would not be preserved, and the Judicial Branch would not be confined to its
limited role in the constitutional framework of government.98
90

547 U.S. 47. 51 70 (2006).

91

Id. at 55.

92

Id. at 60.

93

See generally The Statistics, 121 HARV. L. REv. 436, 442 (2007 08): Erwin Chemerinsky.
The Kennedy Court, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 335, 335 (2006).
94
504 U.S. 555, 573-77 (1992); id. at 579-80 (Kennedy, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring).
95
Id. at 557 58.
96

Id. at 577.

97

Id. at 579-81 (Kennedy, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring).

98

Id. at 581 (Kennedy. J.. concurring).
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In Clinton v. City of New York,99 the Court invalidated the Line Item
Veto Act, saying that the Constitution did not authorize the President to repeal
or amend parts of duly enacted statutes. Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court
emphasized that the procedures for enactment of federal legislation, which did
not authorize such action, were the product of great debates and compromises
that produced the Constitution.100 Justice Kennedy, concurring, provided further reasoned elaboration of the principle behind such a view. He noted that a
law which gives the President sole ability to favor one group or another threatens liberty as does any concentration of power in the hands of a single branch.1 01
The idea and promise of the separation of powers doctrine is that one branch of
government ought not possess the power to shape the people's destiny without a
sufficient check from the other two. 102
03
In Grutter v. Bollinger,1
a 5-4 Court upheld the affirmative action
04
program in student admissions at the University of Michigan Law School.
The majority said that it was applying strict scrutiny, but, in doing so, said that it
deferred to the law school's educational judgment in making academic decisions. 0 5 Justice Kennedy, dissenting, said that when strict scrutiny is properly
applied to a university admissions program that is attempting to attain a critical
mass of minority students, deference should not be given with respect to the
methods by which individual consideration of applicants is preserved. He said
that the law school had made no effort to guard against the danger that race
would become the predominant factor as the school neared the end of the admissions season. 16 To Kennedy, giving deference and not closely examining the
evidence merely because of a policy preference in favor of race-based affirmative action, such as occurred in the majority opinion, joined by instrumentalist
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, was a departure from strict scrutiny, and
would perpetuate the hostilities that proper consideration of race was designed
to avoid. 10 7 Kennedy similarly applied standard strict scrutiny to strike down
the school's affirmative action program in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,108 while departing from the formalist
reasoning of Justice Scalia that any affirmative action program violates the liter99

524 U.S. 417. 438-49 (1998).

1oo

Id. at 439.

101 Id. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
102

Id. at 450 52 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

103 539 U.S. 306, 322-36 (2003).
104 Id. at 343-44.

Id. at 326.
106 Id. at 391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
107
Id. at 388 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
108 551 U.S. 701, 782 98 (2007) (Kennedy. J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg105

ment). On Justice Scalia's views, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200. 239
(1995) (Scalia. J.. concurring in the judgment).
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al command for equal treatment expressed in the Equal Protection Clause. In
Romer v. Evans, 109 Justice Kennedy pointed out that the Court needed to reconcile the principle that no person shall be denied equal protection of the law with
the practical need that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another.
The Court's precedents reflect this balance by providing that if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, a legislative classification will be upheld so long as it bears a rational relation to a legitimate end."' 0
Applying that standard, Justice Kennedy invalidated Colorado's Amendment 2,
which, as interpreted by Justice Kennedy and the other Justices in the majority,
operated to repeal and forbid all laws or policies providing specific protection
for gays or lesbians from discrimination by every level of Colorado government.1
Kennedy concluded that the law was so broad that it lacked a rational
relationship to any legitimate interests. He said that the law was so far removed
from the state's expressed concerns about liberties of landlords or employers
who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality that it is impossible
to credit those alleged objectives, and therefore the law only reflected animus
toward gays and lesbians." 2 Following a long line of precedents, which had
held that mere animus towards groups is an illegitimate interest,11 3 the Colorado
Amendment was therefore held unconstitutional.
In Lawrence v. Texas, " 4 Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that Texas
could not make homosexual sodomy a criminal offence.' 5 For a majority
comprised of instrumentalist Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and natural
law Justices Kennedy and Souter, Kennedy held that intimate decisions concerning physical relationships are a form of "liberty" protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and there is no legitimate state interest
which could justify the intrusion of this law into the personal and private life of
individuals where the criminal barrier does not involve minors, persons who
might be injured or coerced, public conduct, prostitution, or a formal recognition of relationships, and which does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homo-

109

517 U.S. 620, 627-35 (1996).

110

Id. at 633.

112

Id. at 635 36.
Id. at 635.

H,

See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (holding

that prejudice against the mentally impaired an illegitimate governmental interest); Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding that prejudice against interracial marriage an illegiti-

mate governmental interest); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973) (holding that animus toward "hippies" wishing to live in a commune an illegitimate governmental interest).
114 539 U.S. 558, 566-72, 575 (2003) (Kennedy, J., opinion for the Court).
115 Id. at 575 77.
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sexual lifestyle.11 6 In defending this result, Justice Kennedy wrote that a reasoned elaboration of the Court's precedents
show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex .... When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in
and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and private spheres .... [T]his
demeans the lives of homosexual persons." 7
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy held that the state had no legitimate interest in regulating their consensual sexual practices, and that any state
regulation reflected mere "animus" toward them." 8 Justice Kennedy relied in
part upon broader arguments of social practice, including the "values we share
with a wider civilization," and opinions of "the European Court of Human
Rights."' 9 He further noted that, while twenty-four states and the Districts of
Columbia had statutes banning sodomy in 1983, by 2003 legislative practice had
changed, with only nine states banning sodomy generally
and four states, in20
cluding Texas, banning only homosexual sodomy. 1
Adopting a greater focus on historical customs and traditions, typical for
a formalist judge focused on contemporaneous sources of meaning existing at
the time a constitutional provision was ratified, and reflecting a greater focus on
deference to government, typical for a Holmesian judge, Justice Scalia stated in
his dissent, joined by formalist Justice Thomas and Holmesian Chief Justice
Rehnquist,
[A]n "emerging awareness" is by definition not "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition[s]". . . . Many Americans
[still] do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual
conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their
children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as boarders
in their home. They view this as protecting themselves and
2
their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral. ' '

116

Id. at 578.

117

Id. at 572-75.

18

Id. at 568-69.

119

Id. at 573.

120

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570-98.

121

Id. at 598, 602 (Scalia. J.. joined by Rehnquist. C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Perhaps the clearest difference between the four styles of interpretation
appeared in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.122 There, in a 5-4 decision, the
Court decided not to overrule Roe v. Wade. Justices Scalia, with Justices Rehnquist, White, and Thomas, dissented on that matter. Adopting a formalist approach, Justice Scalia said that the Constitution does not protect a fundamental
liberty to abort an unborn child because of two facts: "(1) the Constitution says
absolutely nothing about it [formalist focus on literal text], and (2) the
longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed [formalist focus on historical traditions]." 123
24
The same Justices also joined in a dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist.1
That dissent tracked Justices Rehnquist and White's Holmesian deference-togovernment dissents in Roe twenty years earlier. The fact that a sizable number
of states as a matter of legislative and executive practice banned abortion between 1868 and 1973 formed the basis of Justice White's and Justice Rehnquist's Holmesian dissents in Roe, given the great deference of Holmesians to
legislative and executive practice. Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent in Roe:
By the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868, there were at least 36 laws enacted by state or territorial
legislatures limiting abortion. While many States have amended
or updated their laws, 21 of the laws on the books in 1868 remain in effect today. Indeed, the Texas statute struck down today was, as the majority notes, first enacted in 1857 and 'has
remained substantially unchanged to the present time.' 125
Justice White noted in his dissent in Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton:

The upshot [of Roe] is that the people and the legislatures of the
50 States are constitutionally disentitled to weigh the relative
importance of the continued existence and development of the
fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts
on the mother, on the other hand .... This issue, for the most

part, should be left with the people and to the political
processes
126
the people have devised to govern their affairs.

122

505 U.S. 833 (1992). For a fuller discussion of the four decision-making styles as reflected

in Casey, see R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Swing Votes on the Supreme Court: The Joint
Opinion in Casey and Its Progeny, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 637 (2002).
123
Casey. 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J.. joined by Rehnquist. C.J., and White & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting).

124

Id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia & Thomas, JJ..
dissenting).

125 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 176-77 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
126 410 U.S. 219. 222 (White, J.. joined by Rehnquist. J.. dissenting).
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Agreeing with the instrumentalist approach of Roe, Justice Blackmun
would have had the Court not disturb Roe's holding in any respect. 127 Justice
Stevens, also supporting Roe, said that it protected a woman's freedom to decide
matters of the highest privacy and most personal nature. 128
The outcome of the case thus depended on the views of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. These three Justices joined in a rare joint opinion,
parts of which were likely authored by each of the three Justices, but the opinion
was not specifically authored by any one Justice. The joint opinion opened by
rejecting a formalist view that the textually specific protections of the Bill of
Rights and the customs and traditions of states at the time of ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment mark the outer limits of liberty protected by due
process. Ultimately, they said, it comes down to "reasoned judgment" - the
hallmark of the natural law style. 29 Attempting to describe the central core of
privacy doctrine, the joint opinion said:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education ....
These matters, involving
the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.... At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the
30
mystery of human life. 1
As to whether, with respect to abortion, a state can have an interest sufficient to proscribe it entirely, the joint opinion said that a woman's suffering is
too intimate and personal for the state to insist, without more, upon its own vision of a woman's role. With respect to reservations about reaffirming the central holding of Roe, the authors said they were outweighed by their analysis of
individual liberty combined with the force of stare decisis. Here, stare decisis
was not outweighed by any concern about whether Roe v. Wade was wrongly
decided, because the case has not proved unworkable; people have relied on the
decision; no evolution of legal principle had weakened its doctrinal footings; its

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 923 24 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part.
dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment).
128 Id. at 911-15 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The instrumen127

talist nature of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe is addressed more fully at KELSO & KELSO,
supra note 23. at 1267 70.
129 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
130
Id. at 851 (joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy. and Souter).
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factual underpinnings remain intact; it has been expressly reaffirmed several
times; and overruling might be perceived as a surrender to political pressure.131
Having refused to overrule the central principle that a woman has a right
to terminate her pregnancy before viability, the joint opinion substituted an "undue burden" test for determining when the fundamental right had been violated
- the question being whether a state regulation has "the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
non-viable fetus., 1 32 The opinion then applied that test to the state law in question, striking down a requirement of spousal notification, but upholding, under
rational review, requirements of written informed consent, providing certain
information to the patient, a twenty-four-hour waiting period, required record
keeping, and a parental
consent provision for women under eighteen, with a
33
judicial bypass. 1
In contrast to this approach, the instrumentalist opinions of Justices Stevens and Blackmun in PlannedParenthood v. Casey followed Roe v. Wade in
its entirety, making every burden on abortion rights subject to strict scrutiny.
This constitutionalized, under strict scrutiny, all regulations on abortion, following Roe's concern about specific harm if a pro-choice position were not
adopted. 134 This approach differed from the natural law approach of the joint
opinion in Casey, where the Court did not sit as a super-legislature regarding all
aspects of abortion regulation. Thus, the specific harm paragraph in Roe was
not present in Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter's joint opinion in Casey,
and not every regulation
of abortion was constitutionalized under Roe's strict
35
scrutiny approach. 1
More generally, the importance of the undue burden analysis in the joint
opinion in Casey was to ensure that not every abortion regulation triggered strict
scrutiny, and thus the Court did not act as a policy-making super-legislature,
second-guessing every aspect of abortion regulation - an approach more like
an instrumentalist, social policy style of decision-making. Rather, strict scrutiny
was restricted in Casey to protecting the core principle of personal liberty from
undue burdens.
131 See generally id. at 854-64.

Under this approach, there is a heavy burden to justify over-

ruling a precedent. See generally R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, How the Supreme Court
is Dealing With Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 973 (1996).
132

Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.

133 See generally id. at 874 901.
134 Id. at 917 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 929-34 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)

(Blackmun. J., for the Court) ("Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may
be taxed by child care.").
135 Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 934-40 (Blackmun, J., opinion) (strict scrutiny applied to all of
the legislative regulations in Casey), with id. at 879 901 (joint opinion in Casey) (rational review

applied to less than undue burdens on abortion choice; strict scrutiny applied only to undue burdens).
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It could be argued, given the literal text in Casey, which stated that "[i]n
1 36
judgment, an undue burden is an unconstitutional burden,"
considered
our
that the joint opinion in Casey summarily concluded that the spousal notification
provision was unconstitutional once it was held to be an undue burden. The
better analysis of Casey, consistent with the general structure of fundamental
rights analysis, is that when the joint opinion stated it was upholding the core
holding of Roe, that meant a court should apply Roe's strict scrutiny analysis to
undue burdens on abortion rights. This would mean that where the state has a
compelling interest to regulate, such as to protect maternal health from the first
trimester on, or to protect pre-natal life after viability, a narrowly tailored statute
directly related to advancing that interest and employing the least burdensome
effective alternative would be constitutional even if it placed a substantial obstacle in the path of the woman seeking to obtain an abortion.
In light of the four methods of decision-making, Justice Scalia and
Bryan Garner could have included several additional items in their section on
the General Principles of Argumentation. Addressed to Holmesians, one would
be "Invite consideration of the extent to which deference to governmental decisionmakers is appropriate." Addressed to natural law Justices, a second would
be "Advise on how your position links to basic legal principles and a reasoned
elaboration of the law." A third would be "Advise how your position is consistent with existing judicial precedents or can meet the heavy burden of justifying
the overruling of precedent."' 137 And a fourth, appropriate for a formalist, as
well as for a Holmesian or natural law judge, and perhaps implicit in Scalia and
Garner's book, but useful to state explicitly, would be "Invite consideration of
the extent to which it is important that the law be precise and predictable." That
consideration is one on which formalist, Holmesian, and natural law judges all
138
agree.

136

Id. at 877.

137

On the reasons to overrule a precedent, and the heavy burden a natural law judge requires

before overruling, see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
138
See generally KELSO & KELSO. supra note 23. at 40 (citing Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U.

CHI.

L.

REV.

1175 (1989)); id. at 42 (citing Patrick J. Kelley, Was

Holmes a Pragmatist?Reflections on a New Twist to an Old Argument, 14 S. ILL. L.J. 427, 456

(1990) ("Holmes believed a judge could do a number of things to improve the law within the
limits imposed by his society's prevailing beliefs. First, a judge can increase the effectiveness of
current law in achieving its socially desirable consequences by making it more fixed, definite, and
certain.")); id. at 58 (citing Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases. 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1064 (1975)

(The doctrine [natural law] demands, we might say, articulate consistency.")).
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ProfessorQuirk and Holmesian Decision-Making

In Courts & Congress, Professor William Quirk presents a theory about
how the federal government works, showing its unfortunate consequences, and
calling on the American people to do something that might improve the situation.1 39 Quirk's theory is that in order not to risk incumbency, the members of
Congress have abandoned to the President their responsibilities for matters relating to war and peace, and have allowed the Court to be the final word on the
most important cultural and social controversies - even though Congress could
control the Court by using the Exceptions and Regulations Clause. An unfortunate consequence of all this, says Quirk, is that the people are not controlling
policy through their representatives in Congress, as was intended by the framers.
Instead, foreign affairs are largely in the hands of one person, and domestic affairs are left to unelected Justices. Thus, the American people are governed
by
40
an unwritten Constitution, which Quirk calls "The Happy Convention."'
Professor Quirk is concerned that our society, whose Constitution assumes that sovereignty is in the people, is becoming "the first historical example
of a majority of self-governing people voluntarily turning over their power to
some guardians" - the guardians being the President and the Supreme Court
rather than the Congress, which was intended to be the main outlet for the
people's power. 141 The main goals of Quirk's book are (1) to alert the people to
the great power they were intended to have in Congress, and then (2) to suggest
means for bringing about a better separation of powers so that
Congress is not
42
left to concentrate on its favorite power - spending money. 1
Quirk explains that since Congress has been so quiescent, the political
struggle over wartime issues and other foreign policy matters has become largely a struggle between the President and the Court. The latest round has gone to
the Court, which held 5-4 in Boumediene v. Bush 4 3 that aliens charged with
being enemy belligerents and detained at Guantanamo Bay are entitled to bring
139

QUIRK,

supra note 5. William Quirk is a Professor of Law, University of South Carolina

School of Law.
140

Quirk states, "The new, unwritten constitution is called here the Happy Convention. The

Happy Convention is an informal rearrangement of government powers by which each of the three

branches assigns many of its constitutional responsibilities to other branches." Id. at 2.
141
Id. at 31.
142
Quirk summarizes his theme as follows:
Congress. under the Convention, gives the Court the last word on the country's cultural, social, and moral issues. It gives the President a largely free
hand in foreign affairs, going to war, and national security. The Court and
president are happy to take on additional power. Congress retains the powers
it wants, e.g.,
spending, which help keep its members in office - but it outsources its responsibilities.
Id.at 101.
143
553 U.S.

,128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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habeas corpus in the federal courts because the military commissions set up by
Congress, at the request of the President, did not provide procedures adequate to
be a substitute for habeas corpus.
Quirk suggests several interpretations of the Constitution that would
help make it easier for the federal government to overcome the Happy Conven44
tion. To begin with, the Supreme Court's opinion in Marbury v. Madison1
should be understood, as Quirk says it was by President Lincoln, as establishing
that in a case before the Court, the Court has the duty and power of deciding
what was constitutional. However, the other branches are not bound by that

decision. 145
Next, Quirk suggests that Congress should feel free to strip the Court of
appellate jurisdiction in many situations. In three Appendices he tells the story
of a number of strippers that were enacted by Congress and upheld by the Court.
As for UnitedStates v. Klein,1 6 which some have interpreted as holding that the
Exceptions and Regulations Clause must be accommodated with other provisions in the Constitution to insure that Congress, by stripping the Court of jurisdiction, does not deprive the Court of its constitutional role to interpret the Constitution,147 Quirk appears to approve a statement by current Chief Justice Roberts, who, while serving as a special assistant to the Attorney General, wrote
that the Act in Klein "was unconstitutional because it granted the Court j urisdiction but then limited the Court's consideration of the relevant law."1 48 As thus
interpreted, the decision would have little relevance to the usual stripper bill.
The book is an interesting read because Professor Quirk supplies so
much historical evidence in support of his conclusions. For those who demand
thoroughly balanced presentations on political issues, there will be disappointment. On the other hand, for those who want to see what can be said in favor of
a change in relationships between Congress and the Court and, as well, the President, and to what substantive policies this might lead, there is much to enjoy.
For example, Quirk states flatly, "The Happy Convention's debt habits will

144

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

supra note 5 (discussing Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4. 1861
(cited in 4 BASLER, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (1953) ("[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the
whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are
made, in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased, to be
their own rules, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government into the hands of that
eminent tribunal."))).
145

QUIRK,

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
See generally Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialetic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner. Congressional Power Over the Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1961); Martin H.
Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internaland External Examination,27 VILL. L. REV. 900 (1982).
146

147

148

QUIRK,

supra note 5, at 288.
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bankrupt the country." 149 Again, "The Happy Convention didn't invent the basic deceptions built into the Social Security system, but it transformed a middle
class irritant into a major hit."'"5
Despite all of Quirk's talk about the need for change, one senses that
Quirk does not feel that he is beginning a movement with much chance for success in modifying the Happy Convention. In a particularly poignant paragraph
opening Chapter 6, entitled "Life under the Happy Convention," Quirk states:
A citizen living under the Happy Convention leads a life of frustration. The Court has no respect for the majority's values so
culture war issues explode like roadside bombs. The citizen
might well prefer not to hear about homosexual rights, flag
burning, Ten Commandment plaques, abortion, atheist rights,
and the death penalty for minors. But the citizen has no choice.
The press, full of volatile, intemperate debate, intrudes on his
life. This is not only distasteful but pointless, considering that
the citizen, if he doesn't like what the Court has done, can't do
anything about it. The electoral process, under the Happy Convention, is next to useless. The constitutional amendment
process, under the Convention, is dead as a doornail. The
Court's rulings, under the Convention, cannot be changed.' 5
Since the modern era of Supreme Court activism was inaugurated by
Brown v. Board of Education in 1954,152 Quirk's concern has been echoed by a
number of other writers, 5 3 including Professor Louis Lusky in his 1993 book,
Our Nine Tribunes: The Supreme Court in Modern America. 5 4 As Professor
Lusky indicates in his book, the debate began even earlier in 1938 in the famous
footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products, Inc. " In this famous footnote, the Supreme Court sketched three types of situations in which the normal
presumption of constitutionality and deference to the legislature might not be
appropriate:

149

Id. at 135.

150

151

Id. at 139.
Id. at 129.

152

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

153

See generally ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE

LAW

(1986);

JOHN DENTON CARTER, THE WARREN COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL

VIEW OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

(1973);

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF

JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980): Louis LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975).
154 Louis LUSKY, OUR NINE TRIBUNES: THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN AMERICA

(1993).

155 304 U.S. 144. 152 n.4 (1938).
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(1) There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to
be within specific prohibitions of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth....
(2) It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation.
(3) Nor need we enquire whether . . . statutes directed against
particular religious, or national, or racial minorities. . . . [or]

prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry. 156
As Professor Lusky pointed out, paragraph one of footnote 4 in Justice
Stone's opinion in CaroleneProducts was added at the suggestion of Chief Justice Hughes, and rests on different premises than paragraphs two and three.
Paragraphs two and three of footnote 4 affirm "self-government" principles:
paragraph two affirms a commitment to government "by the people[,]" and paragraph three focuses on government "by the whole people[,]" which includes
discrete and insular minorities. Paragraph one's commitment to specific protections in the Constitution, particularly the first ten amendments that focus mostly
on protecting individuals from the government, and which are applicable to the
states through being incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, is based
more on "individual autonomy" concerns, not "self157
government."
From this perspective, Professor Quirk's and Lusky's concerns really
come down to whether one thinks the framers and ratifiers were more concerned
only about the Court interpreting the Constitution to advance self-government,
and deferring to the other political branches in other cases (and, thus, support
heightened Court scrutiny based only on Carolene Products footnote 4 paragraphs two and three), or whether one thinks the framers believed individuals
had natural law autonomy rights to be free from government regulation which
they expected the Court to protect (as in Carolene Products footnote 4 para156

Id. (citations omitted).

157

See LUSKY, supra note 154, at 123 30.
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graph one). Judges and commentators who believe the former tend to share
Justice Holmes' strong posture of judicial deference to government, reflected on
the recent Supreme Court in opinions by Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts.
Judges and commentators, who share the latter premise, tend to approach constitutional doctrine more from the natural law perspective of Chief Justice John
Marshall and Justice Story, reflected on the recent Supreme Court in opinions
by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. 5' 8
As Quirk's critique of the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledges,
since Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the Court has adopted more the
natural law approach, rather than the Holmesian approach, to constitutional interpretation. By so doing, the Court has increased autonomy rights for individuals from government, including rights of minorities not to suffer pervasive discrimination, have better assured individuals of their freedom to speak, and have
provided criminal defendants with some rights to protect them from unjustified
convictions.
In our view, Quirk's book would have been a better source for thoughtful appraisal of the current governmental situation in the United States if Quirk
had presented arguments "the other way" regarding some of these consequences
of modern Supreme Court decision-making with as much detail and gusto as he
presented his own views and the historical events he believes show support for
those views. On the other hand, the author has shown that he is not intimidated
by political correctness or by the aura of respectability associated with many
organizations. He asserts, for example, "The ABA and the rest of the legal establishment have not helped the public understand the Constitution."'" 9 He has
called the shots as he sees them. And, had he engaged in such a detailed presentation of opposing views, his book would have been a tome instead of a readable
collection of generalities plus historical support that now appears in its relatively
short 211 pages of main text, followed by eighty-three pages of historical appendices on stripping legislation.
The bottom line is that a reader already tending to believe Quirk's main
thesis will have that belief strengthened by this book. However, a reader tending the other way will not likely be persuaded to change his or her mind because
the arguments which might be used to evaluate, qualify, or weaken Quirk's positions, are not dealt with in this book. Nonetheless, even disbelievers or doubters still might enjoy reading about what can be said against the "Happy Convention" by a talented writer who enjoys dealing with history.
158

See generallysupra notes 75-136 and accompanying text (comparing the Holmesian versus

natural law style of interpretation in specific cases). For further discussion of the natural law
versus Holmesian difference in constitutional interpretation in the context of the issues raised by
Professors Quirk and Lusky. see Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Our Nine Tribunes: A
Review of ProfessorLusky's Callfor JudicialRestraint, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1289 (1995).
For discussion of natural law versus Holmesian constitutional interpretation more generally, see
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 303-24, 354-404.
159 QUIRK, supra note 5, at 106.
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ProfessorFarberand NaturalLaw Versus Instrumentalism

The Ninth Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights - the first ten
Amendments, which in 1833 in Barron v. Baltimore 16 were held to be limited
to the federal government. 161 The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."'' 62 In his latest book, Retained by the
People: The "Silent" Ninth Amendment and the Constitutional Rights Americans Don't Know They Have, Professor Daniel A. Farber first observes that the
63
Ninth Amendment appears in only one Supreme Court concurring opinion.1
He then sets forth how he thinks judges should reason when finding limits on
government power with aid from the Ninth Amendment.
Farber says that even without overruling Barron v. Baltimore, the principles of the Ninth Amendment should apply to restrain powers of the states as
well as the federal government. The reason is that those principles are included
within the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
(which Farber abbreviates as the "P or I Clause"). 164 The P or I Clause provides:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States .
,,165
Farber reasons that the
Ninth Amendment is an acknowledgment that citizens of the United States have
certain retained rights, which are privileges and immunities under both natural
law and the Bill of Rights. Thus, they are protected from state action by the P or
I Clause.166 Contra to Farber's analysis, the Supreme Court held, in the Slaughter-House Cases, that those privileges or immunities were limited to a citizen's
relationships with the federal government, rather than applying the Bill of
Rights or other unspecified natural rights against the states. 167
Consistent with Farber's wishes, the Supreme Court has frequently applied vigorous scrutiny to both federal and state deprivations of certain unenumerated rights or Bill of Rights provisions designated as "fundamental." It has
done so, however, under the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.1 68 Farber argues that this reasoning with
160

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).

161

Id. at 247.

162 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
163

FARBER. supra note 6, at x (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Goldberg.

J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Brennan. J., concurring) (striking down a ban on counseling the use
of contraceptives, applied to a married couple)). Daniel Farber is a Professor of Law, University
of California Law School, Berkeley.
164
FARBER. supra note 6. at 73.
165

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

FARBER. supra note 6. at 68 70.
167 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1873).
168 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
166

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (unenu-
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regard to unenumerated rights is less soundly based than use of the Ninth
Amendment because that Amendment explicitly recognizes the existence of
such rights. During the time of the framers, those rights were thought to inhere
in natural law, as recognized in the Declaration of Independence. Today such
rights are increasingly recognized in international law, and in the law and the
practices of many other nations, as well as our own.169
Farber criticizes conservatives generally, and Justice Scalia in particular, for saying that they are unable to find a meaning in the Ninth Amendment or
for refusing to use it from fear of being labeled judicial activists. 17 At the opposite extreme, Farber challenges libertarians who would use the Ninth
Amendment to protect a right to do whatever one wants whenever it is
wanted.1 71 He suggests a method for dealing with the Ninth Amendment that he
thinks should produce reasoned decisions. 172 He also explores results from use
of that method in dealing with current issues relating to unenumerated rights some of which have been recognized in Supreme Court opinions, and some of
which have yet to be so recognized. 13
The book is divided into four parts. Part I, on Unwritten Rights and the
Constitution, builds on quotations from James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, John
Marshall, and Joseph Story to show that during the Founding era the idea of
unwritten rights flowing from natural law was supported in many ways, including English common law and the law of nations. 174 The idea was captured in
the opening of the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness." 1 75 Farber shows how concern was expressed that the
new federal government might have power to invade some of those rights, and
that James Madison proposed the Bill of Rights as a defense. The Ninth
Amendment was Madison's answer to the "exclusivity argument," that listing
certain rights in the Constitution would be understood as a denial of other
rights. 176

merated rights cases); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (summarizing fundamental Bill of Rights provisions).
169
FARBER, supra note 6, at 184, 190-91.

170 Id. at 10 11. Farber states that Justice Scalia "and company" are "radicals in black robes."
Id. at 192.
171
Id. at 12-13.
172 Id.at 108.
173 See generally id. at 111 72.

The issues Farber discusses include reproductive rights, the

end of life, gay rights, education, the right to government protection. the right to travel, and other
rights.
174

Id. at 25.

175

Id.at 22 (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE).

176

Id. at 40-41.
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Prior to the Civil War, Congress did little regulating and so there was no
reason to raise the Ninth Amendment as a defense to federal regulation. As a
result, says Farber, the Ninth Amendment faded from view. 7 After the Civil
War there were efforts to abolish slavery and to protect the human rights of
former slaves. The Civil War Amendments resulted, and there was a new basis
for protecting unenumerated rights against action by the states.
Part II, on Protecting Fundamental Rights, is preceded by Farber making clear that floor debate on the Fourteenth Amendment suggested that the P or
I Clause was intended to overrule Barron v. Baltimore. 78 In 1873, however, the
Court gave the P or I Clause a narrow interpretation in the Slaughter-House
Cases,179 saying that the P or I Clause protected only a short list of rights which
owed their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws. Supplying a few examples, the Court spoke of coming to
the seat of government to assert any claim on the government, free access to its
seaports, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the right to use navigable
waters, and the right to peacefully assemble and petition government for redress
of grievances. "0 When the Court began to expand the protection of unenumerated rights in the 1900s in cases like Meyer v. Nebraska (right to teach and
learn in English); Skinner v. Oklahoma (strict scrutiny of classifications in a
compulsory sterilization law); and Griswold v. Connecticut (use of contraceptives by married persons),1 81 the Court had long since stopped talking about
natural law, it had never used the Ninth Amendment, and it settled on the Due
Process Clause as the primary source for reasoning about unenumerated rights
that could be considered "fundamental," and whose deprivation triggered strict
scrutiny. 182
As for determining what rights are "fundamental," the Court said in the
1930s that the test was whether a right was essential to "ordered liberty," so
that abolishing it would violate a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.18 3 Since then the
Court has gradually softened its test and has enlarged the scope of personal interests that qualify as being fundamental. Farber praises as true to the vision of
James Madison and his generation Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas, 8 4 where the Court struck down a Texas statute that made homosexual
sodomy a crime. Justice Kennedy spoke of intimate, personal choices central to

178

Id. at 46.
Id. at 68 70 (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 321 U.S. 243, 247 51 (1833)).

179

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36. 79 80 (1873).

180

Id.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 85 (1965): Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.

177

181

535. 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
182

FARBER.

supra note 6. at 83.

183 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (citations omitted).
184

539 U.S. 558. 566 75 (2003).
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385

personal dignity and autonomy, and relied on a variety of sources summarized
by Farber:
*

The general thrust of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on

privacy issues, which tended to reject interference with intimate
relationships;
* State court decisions holding sodomy laws unconstitutional
under their own state constitutions;
* A strong trend toward abolition of sodomy laws by state legislatures;
* Decisions of international human rights tribunals, particularly
in Europe, that had rejected sodomy bans. 185
Farber says that Justice Kennedy's approach is not an invitation to judicial activism. It actually restrains8the
Court by making it a part of a larger com6
munity of courts and lawmakers. 1
Farber concludes Part II by setting out his own list of criteria for determining when an alleged right deserves Ninth Amendment protection. The list of
seven factors that Farber says should be considered in determining under the
Ninth Amendment whether a given right is fundamental is as follows:
* Supreme Court precedent establishing the right or analogous
rights;
* Connections with specific constitutional guarantees;
* Long standing, specific traditions upholding the right;
*

Contemporary societal consensus about the validity of the

right;
* Decisions by American lawmakers and judges recognizing the
right;
* Broader or more recent American traditions consistent with
the right;
* Decisions by international lawmakers and judges recognizing
the right. 87
185

FARBER, supra note 6, at 89.

186

Id. at 95.
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In Part III, on Applying the Ninth Amendment, Professor Farber considers some specific issues that the Court has or may consider in the future.
Using his approach to identifying fundamental rights under the Ninth Amendment, he offers suggestions on how those matters should be resolved. On abortion, Farber says that a state should not be able to ban all abortions before the
eighth week, 88 and should not be able to prevent abortions for the life or health
of the mother, rape or incest, or because of a deformed fetus.' 89 He approves
the "undue burden" test of Casey. 190
Regarding the end of life, he would find, with the Court, that there is a
right to refuse medical treatment.' 9' However, he thinks that not enough is
known about the effect of laws barring assisted suicide for the Court to hold
today that there is a fundamental right to assisted suicide, at least in the absence
of permanent, agonizing pain. Thus, he agrees with the Court's holding in
Washington v. Glucksberg.192 He favors the conclusion, in accord with Justice
Kennedy's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, that homosexual sodomy cannot be
criminalized. 93 However, limiting "marriage" to heterosexuals might rationally
be justified by a need for greater stability in such relationships because of children. Accordingly, he says, 194
the time has not yet come for finding a fundamental
right to same-sex marriage.
Farber unhesitatingly affirms that at least a minimum level of education
is a fundamental right that states must provide, as must the federal government
in the District of Columbia. Farber disagrees with the Court's failure to hold, in
San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez, that there is a fundamental right to education.195 A fundamental right should also be recognized, says
Farber, in obtaining protection from violence when a law enforcement official is
aware that violence is occurring and has a reasonable opportunity to deal with
it.196

187

Id. at 108.

188

Id. at 113.

189

Id. at 114.

190 Id. at 115. See supra notes 130-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "undue
burden" test.
supra note 6. at 124.
192 Id. at 129 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
191

FARBER.

193 Id. at 137 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
194

Id. at 141.

195 Id. at 153 (citing Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (no right to

equal educational funding under the United States Constitution)). The Court has not yet definitively resolved the question of a right to minimal funding. as opposed to equal funding addressed
in Rodriguez. See generally Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (Rodriguez has "not yet
definitively settled ... whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded heightened equal
protection review.").
196
FARBER. supra note 6. at 139.
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According to Farber, there is a fundamental right to travel within a state,
between states, and internationally. 197 Going well beyond the cases, he suggests
that there is also a fundamental right to possess one's home unless there is a
need for building a highway or urban renewal and no feasible and prudent alternative. 198 And the Constitution should give some protection to informational
privacy by restricting the government from disclosure of personal information.' 99
In Part IV on Broader Implications, Farber analyzes what kind of decision-making should accompany use of the Ninth Amendment and the P or I
Clause to define and protect minority rights. He expresses the matter in a variety of ways, summarized in this statement: Good constitutional decisions involve
neither the mechanical application of formal rules nor the freewheeling ways of
pure politics. They rely instead on judgment and discretion, which by definition
incorporate both flexibility and constraints. 0
Regarding constraints on the recognition of further unenumerated fundamental rights, Farber mentions the selection process, the isolation of judges,
the extensive use of precedent in constitutional law, and a common preference
for evolutionary rather than radical change. With regard to citing foreign and
international law, Farber points out that this has been done in many Supreme
Court opinions since the beginning, and makes sense because "when other capable people are struggling earnestly
with the same issues that concern us, it is
21
foolish to ignore their efforts.,
Farber closes his book by noting that protecting fundamental rights is
one of the great American traditions. It stretches from the Declaration of Independence to Madison's framing of the Ninth Amendment, and from the creation
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Supreme Court's modern case law. 20 2 It
seems clear that Farber's vision for using the Ninth Amendment and the P or I
Clause to protect individuals from government action does not signal a campaign for extremely creative extensions of existing law. Speaking of informational privacy, Farber approves of Justice Breyer's 2position,
stating that "it may
03
be useful for courts to take small steps in this area.,
Professor Farber has selected a topic not much discussed in legal literature. He has addressed what could be a dry subject in a remarkably readable
fashion. The reader is sent back into history, brought forward, presented with a
theory of interpretation, and then shown how it can be applied to a variety of
fact situations. The basic materials should be familiar to any person who has
197
198

Id. at 166.
Id. at 169.

200

Id. at 171.
Id. at 176.

201

Id. at 195.

202

Id. at 200.

203

Id. at 172.

199
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taken a course on constitutional law, but Professor Farber has provided interesting details that would not ordinarily be provided in a basic course.
Fans of Justice Kennedy will enjoy Professor Farber's frequent praise of
how Justice Kennedy's views accord with those of the framers. Fans of Justice
Scalia may be turned off by Farber's frequent criticism. The underlying tension
is of course quite familiar to anyone who has been reading current Supreme
Court opinions. Justice Scalia, as well as Justices Thomas and Alito, tend to
approach constitutional interpretation as formalists, who believe in a static or
fixed Constitution that does not evolve in meaning over time, but rather whose
meaning is determined primarily by literal interpretation and respect for historical traditions.2 °4 Justice Kennedy's approach mirrors the early natural law lawyers', including Chief Justice John Marshall, who believed more in an evolving
Constitution based on enlightened reasoning about the natural law principles
placed into the Constitution by the framers and ratifiers. 205 A complete theory
of current Supreme Court decision-making would have to note that there are two
other views regarding constitutional interpretation: (1) the liberal instrumentalism of Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer; 20 6 and (2) the deference to government Holmes-like posture of Chief Justice Roberts.2 °7
There is no reason to believe that any of the Justices are not doing their
sincere best to discover and apply interpretations of the Constitution in a way
which comports with their most deeply held views on the nature of the Constitution and the proper role of the Court. Thus, Professor Farber might well have
taken a slightly more temperate view of Justices other than Kennedy. However,
he is to be praised for the cautious and reasoned way that he applies his criteria
for deciding Ninth Amendment cases. It is clear from those applications, as
described above, that his approach does not necessarily lead to a revolution in
constitutional law, as he assures his readers several times.2 °8
As noted above, Farber indicates that seven factors should be used in
determining rights under the Ninth Amendment: (1) precedent, (2) specific constitutional guarantees, (3) long-standing traditions, (4) contemporary societal
consensus, (5) legislation, (6) recent traditions, and (7) international lawmaking. 20 9 A more-structured approach, related to the four styles of deciding used
by current Justices, would organize these sources as in Tables I and 2 presented
in Part II.2 As those tables indicate, a formalist, like Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito, will focus on text, context, and historical sources of constitutional
interpretation, believing that only sources contemporaneous with ratification of
204

See supratext accompanying notes 27-29.

205

See supratext accompanying notes 33 34.

206

See supratext accompanying notes 23-26.

207

See supratext accompanying notes 31 32.

208

FARBER. supra note 6. at 91, 181, 198.

209

See supratext accompanying note 187.
See supratext accompanying notes 44-48.

210
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a constitutional provision should be used (in Farber's terms, specific guarantees
in the Constitution and long-standing historical traditions existing at the time of
ratification upholding the right). Under this approach, the Constitution's meaning will be fixed at ratification. For a Holmesian judge, such as Chief Justice
Roberts and the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, it is also appropriate to look for the
purpose behind a provision and to consider and often defer to subsequent practice (in Farber's terms, legislation by American lawmakers after ratification
recognizing the right and broader or more recent American traditions consistent
with the right since ratification). For a natural law judge, like Justice Kennedy
or former Justices O'Connor and Powell, interpretation begins with the text,
context, history, and subsequent practice. However, beyond these sources used
by formalists and Holmesians, great weight is also given to precedents, both
core holdings of precedent and reasoned elaboration of general principles that
can be found in the Constitution or precedents (in Farber's terms, Supreme
Court precedent establishing the right or analogous rights; and recent recognition of a right by American judges). Instrumentalist Justices consider all of
these sources and, in addition, the predicted consequences of alternative decisions, evaluated in light of prudential2 or policy considerations (in Farber's
terms, contemporary social consensus). 1
In his list of seven factors, Farber also states that decisions by interna212
and judges recognizing a right are also properly considered.
lawmakers
tional
For a natural law judge like Justice Kennedy, whose general perspective Farber
seems to favor, such international decisions should only be used by American
judges to the extent they help the understanding of some general principle that
the framers and ratifiers placed into the Constitution, rather than the instrumentalist focus on whether the international decision is merely good public policy.
Since many of the framers and ratifiers believed in natural law, many of the
individual rights in the Constitution were likely understood to have a universal
natural law base.21 3
Perhaps the most relevant impediment to Professor Farber's approach
for direct use of the Ninth Amendment by the Court is not the views of formalists, who of course can be expected to oppose this development on grounds that
the Ninth Amendment does not literally specify any particular rights, or a Holmesian judge, on grounds the Court should defer to government action unless
the unconstitutionality of the law is clear, but the great respect for precedent
211

See generally FARBER, supra note 6, at 113 14.

212

Id. at 108.

213

See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 365-66 (citing Sarah H. Cleveland, Our

International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2006) (discussing cases where the Constitution
refers to international law or international law is used as a background principle to identify the
territorial scope of the Constitution, the powers of the national government, delineate structural
relationships within the federal system. or individual rights cases); David Fontana. Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REv. 539. 575 83 (2001) (discussing judicial

practice from 1789 through the Civil War)).
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held by the natural law swing Justice - Justice Kennedy. As Professor Farber
indicates, the Supreme Court has never explicitly relied upon the Ninth
Amendment as an independent source for recognizing rights. 214 To the extent
Professor Farber wishes additional unenumerated fundamental rights to be protected by the Supreme Court, it seems that the Ninth Amendment is more likely
to be used, if at all, as "collateral support" for rights developed through expansion of existing substantive due process doctrine (or reinterpretation of the P or I
Clause). 215

Under a "collateral support" view, the Ninth Amendment means just
what it says, that is, that the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution
should not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
From this perspective, the Ninth Amendment is a reminder of the background
natural law theory that individuals have unalienable rights the government is
created to protect 6 As has been noted,
The Founding generation disagreed about many things, but the
existence of natural rights was not one of them. From James
Madison to Roger Sherman, from The FederalistPapersto the
Antifederalist papers, both supporters and opponents of the
Constitution repeatedly affirmed their shared belief in natural
rights. Virtually all commentators agree that the [f]ramers and
ratifiers of the Bill of Rights believed in natural rights as a general matter. 17
As Farber indicates, one concern that Madison and others had in drafting the Bill of Rights was that under the maxim of construction, expressio unius
est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing implies exclusion of others),
the enumeration of certain rights in the Bill of Rights might suggest that the
federal government had plenary power over all other matters.21 8 Since that view
was inconsistent with the intent of the framers and ratifiers that the federal government be a government of limited, delegated power, the Ninth Amendment
was an attempt to craft language to prevent federal governmental power from
being construed in any broader way. Based on an exhaustive look at the history
and precedents of the Ninth Amendment, Professor Kurt Lash has noted:
supra note 6, at 1-2.
215 That door was partially opened in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (citizens of the United
214

FARBER,

States have a right protected by the P or I Clause to go to any state they choose and become citizens therein with an equality of rights with every other citizen).
216

See generally Randy Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1

(1988): David N. Mayer, The NaturalRights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Professor
MeAffee. 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54
U. Cmu. L. REV. 1127 (1987).
217
Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?. 100 YALE L.J. 1073.
1974 75 (1991) (citations omitted).
218 See FARBER, supra note 6, at 33.
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One of the original purposes of the Ninth Amendment was to
prevent the Bill of Rights from being construed to suggest that
congressional power extended to all matters except those expressly restricted. As Joseph Story would later write in his
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States:
[The Ninth Amendment] was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse, or ingenious misapplication of the well
known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases implies a negation in all others; and e converso, that a negation in particular cases implies an affirmation in all others.
The maxim, rightly understood, is perfectly sound and safe;
but it has often been strangely forced from its natural meaning into the support of the most dangerous political heresies. The amendment was undoubtedly suggested by the
reasoning of the Federalist on the subject of a general bill of
rights.2 19
From this perspective, the Ninth Amendment is a reminder that in interpreting all of the other clauses of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights
and the Civil War Amendments, there is reason to use a natural law theory of
interpretation, which supports background natural rights, even if not specifically
enumerated in constitutional text. Farber's book promotes this result, but differs
from this perspective, since under a "collateral support" view the development
of rights will be done primarily under substantive due process analysis, as currently done, and not the Ninth Amendment.
Professor Farber has written an interesting and readable book on a
clause in the Constitution not discussed much in the constitutional literature, the
Ninth Amendment.
While provocative in trying to resuscitate the Ninth
Amendment as an independent source of fundamental rights persons may have
against state and federal governments, long-standing Supreme Court precedent
suggests that the Court will likely continue to develop the fundamental rights
doctrine through the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and not the Ninth Amendment, as Farber advocates.
In addition, no matter which clause of the Constitution is used- Ninth
Amendment or Due Process - there is a question of which of Farber's seven
factors regarding interpretation a majority of the Supreme Court will adopt in
developing a fundamental rights analysis. As indicated above, 220 the seven factors used will depend on whether the controlling votes on the Court are held by
formalist, Holmesian, natural law, or instrumentalist Justices. It is unlikely in
219

Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REv. 597, 619

(2005) (citing

JOSEPH STORY,

3

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §

1898 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833)).
220
See supratext accompanying notes 209 213.
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any near future a majority of the Court will adopt all seven of Farber's factors,
reflecting an instrumentalist approach to judicial decision-making. Despite his
praise for Justice Kennedy in his book, Kennedy is not likely to make much use
in his decision-making of Farber's factor of contemporary views of good social
policy, and Kennedy will tend to use international sources not based on whether
they appear to be good social policy, but on whether they reflect a natural law
principle ofjustice.21
D.

ProfessorEdwardPurcell andInstrunentalism

In his book, Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutional
Enterprise,22 2 Professor Edward Purcell notes that the relationship between the
federal government and the states has changed from time to time since the Constitution was ratified. He concludes that this was inevitable and not a bad thing.
The challenge facing government officials has always been to determine what is
most appropriate for current conditions. Purcell adds that even if one believes
in a static Constitution, as do formalists, and that the Constitution should be
interpreted as understood by the framers and ratifiers, they did not have a single
agreed-upon understanding of what relationships had been created between the
federal government and the states or whether certain subjects were exclusively
for the states.223
This view regarding the intent of the framers and ratifiers mirrors the
instrumentalist view of Justice Brennan, and others, that a formalist style of
interpretation is impractical, without regard to whether it issound as a theoretical matter. As Justice Brennan once noted about historical intent, "Typically, all
that can be gleaned is that the Framers themselves did not agree about the application or meaning of particular
constitutional provisions and hid their differenc' 224
es in cloaks of generality.
Purcell first inquires into why there was no clear understanding at the
beginning.225 Then Purcell considers the consequences of that fact for American legal history. 226 He concludes with implications for relationships today

221

See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note 23, at 12, 54 62. 354-404 (discussing the natural

law theory of interpretation, and its use by. among others, Chief Justice John Marshall, Justice
Story, and, more recently, to various degrees, Justices Powell. O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter).
The instrumentalist leanings of Justice Souter, perhaps closer to Professor Farber's views, are
discussed at id. at 400-04. The non-instrumentalist, and occasionally formalist, leanings of Justice Kennedy are discussed at id. at 393-94.
222
PURCELL. supra note 7. Purcell is the Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor, New York
Law School.
223
Id. at 17.
224
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,

27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986).
225 PURCELL, supra note 7, at 17-20 (Part I. "Structural Intrinsics").
226

Id. at 85 (Part i1.
"Consequential Dynamics").

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss2/5

42

Kelso and Kelso: Judicial Decision-Making and Judicial Review: The State of the De
2010]

JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

within227and between the states, and between the states and the federal government.

In Part I ("Structural Intrinsics"), Purcell provides copious contemporary quotations by framers and others which show that there was no single original understanding of the Constitution regarding issues of federalism. 228 Further, it is unlikely that there could have been any such understanding because of
four characteristics of the Constitution regarding relationships between the federal government and the states. Those four characteristics, says Purcell, were
that federalism in the Constitution was double blurred, fractionated, instrumental, and contingent. 2 9 Purcell's explanations of these four characterizations
follow.
"Double blurred" refers to the fact that the Constitution recognized two
levels of government (states and federal) which had overlapping powers whose
boundaries were not clearly identified.2 30 "Fractionated" refers to the fact that
the Constitution created a federal government that had three different sources of
power that could affect the states differently from time to time. 23' The Constitution is "Instrumental" in that from concern about power abuses by different factions, the Constitution has built-in devices to allow one level or branch to check
another. 232 Constitutional provisions were "Contingent" in that the Constitution
contained many concepts that would inevitably evolve over time, such as
"common Defence," "general Welfare," and "Commerce," and it provided for
its own amendment.233 Thus, Purcell concludes that there were too many ambiguities and elasticities to define any single and correct balance between states
234
and the nation..
And even if there were at the beginning, it would have been
impossible to maintain a definitive boundary between state and national authorities in view of rapidly changing conditions in technology, business, and social
arrangements.235
The depth of Purcell's scholarship is most evident in Part II ("Consequential Dynamics"). Writing from a broad general perspective but including
pin-point detail, Purcell considers events relating to federalism from four different perspectives. First, there were efforts in the political sphere that involved
relations within and among the states to compete and to cooperate for various
ends thought desirable.236 Second, there were activities by each of the branches
Id. at 189 (Part 11. "Conclusion").
228 Id. at 17 20.
227

229

Id. at 6.

230
231

Id.at 17.
Id.at 38.

232

Id.at 53.

233

Id. at 69.

234

Id. at 85.

235

Id. at 76.

236

Id. at 86 93.
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of the federal government, including administrative agencies, to influence
237
events that involved the states.. Third, there have been various competing
theories of federalism in the courts and in the political events that influence who
serves on the courts. 238 Finally, he discusses views on the values alleged to be
served by federalism, e.g., by leaving certain matters to the states as policy or as
constitutionally required. z39
The first of three main values asserted by some to be served by federalism is "preserving liberty., 240 Purcell points out, however, that the United
States government was designed to protect liberty and to be the remedy for local
abuses.2z4 And, as for the practical workings of federalism, the states failed to
act as checks in World War I years, in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, or during
242
the McCarthy era. Indeed, the states indulged in parallel abuses.
The second value advanced for federalism is that it supports the states
as "independent laboratories" for constructive experiments. In response, Purcell
noted that this offers no help in identifying specific lines between state and national authority, and that the Constitution was intended to prevent experimentation with the fundamental rights of individuals. 2 43
A third value offered for federalism is that decentralized government
protects distinctly "local" values and interests. However, from the Civil War
onward there has been much movement toward homogenization in the United
States. Americans now rely on the same sources for information, education, and
244
entertainment. 2 The disappearance of authentically local ideas has been evidenced in the development of uniform laws that respond to integrated and expanding national and international markets. Also, some of the local values held
most firmly in the 18th century, slavery among them, have been repudiated by
constitutional provisions, national legislation, Supreme Court rulings, and a
developing national culture. 245 Further, local issues that absorb contemporary
Americans increasingly are manifestations of problems common across the nation.246
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Another change, Purcell says, is that the early concept of "dual federalism" that there were two sovereigns with specific areas of authority evolved into "cooperative federalism" - where federal power is elastic. 24' The
levels of government have overlapping interests and functions and they rely on
political parties and pressure groups to maintain the system's working boundaries. 24 8
In his Part III ("Conclusion"), Purcell does not criticize the outcome of
any particular theory of federalism. Instead, he calls for any decision on federalism to be reasoned in terms of the ideals of the Constitution and the anticipated
practical consequences in terms of such values as political democracy and individual freedom. He suggests that for federalism issues, as generally in constitutional law, decisions are based on personal viewpoints and interests. He criticizes originalists insofar as their reasoning is based upon a conclusion that the
Constitution sets forth a specific theory on how the national government is related to state governments. But he admits that he cannot criticize their conclusions to any greater degree than the conclusions of non-originalists because both
are based on personal viewpoints and both, presumably, are sincere efforts to
decide rightly.249
Purcell concludes by advising that the Court could increase the likelihood of reaching wise results in federalism cases by following three general cautions. 2 50 First, it should recognize that such cases call for careful, flexible, and
pragmatic line-drawing. Second, the Court should carefully analyze and explain
likely consequences. Third, in determining whether any particular decision is
consistent with the "values of federalism," the Court should determine whether
and how the decision would affect both individual rights and open democratic
processes. Only in this way can the Court demonstrate why its federalism decisions are both practically necessary and generally benevolent.
By grounding his jurisprudence ultimately on such pragmatic arguments
of good policy, Purcell adopts, at the end of the day, an instrumentalist approach
to constitutional interpretation. Purcell asserts, and probably correctly, that no
line between the national government and the states could be drawn in terms of
subjects that are "truly local" or "traditional,, 25 1 as Justice Rehnquist attempted
to do in National League of Cities v. Usery.252 National League was overruled
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,2 53 where the Court
held that, despite the Tenth Amendment, the only federalism limit on Congress's power to regulate states directly was the Nation's political process.
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However, had the Court held consistently to the framing era's "dual theory of
sovereignty" - elaborated in a natural law way consistent with the vision of
Chief Justice Marshall and the Marshall Court - the Court could have bequeathed to the Nation a workable vision of federalism - a view that might
have survived the many changes reviewed by Purcell.
Under the "dual theory of sovereignty," as explained by Justice Kennedy in US. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,254 the genius of our founding generation was to split sovereignty in the United States system into two parts: states
and federal government. As Chief Justice Marshall had noted in McCulloch v.
2 55
Maryland,
the founding generation established dual systems of government
- states and federal government - with each deriving its authority independently from the consent of the people. The Constitution, after all, was adopted,
as stated in the first three words of the Constitution, by "We, the People," not
"We, the States." Further, the Constitution was ratified in special state conventions elected specially by the people for that purpose, not ratified by the existing
state legislatures. Thus, in our system, there are two sovereign entities, the federal government and the states, both created by "the People," which are linked
by the Constitution's Supremacy Clause of Article VI, § 2.
Under this dual theory of sovereignty, the federal government can regulate both individuals and states where constitutional power exists under the
United States Constitution, and states can regulate individuals and the federal
government under their own state constitutions and the United States Constitution consistent with doctrines of intergovernmental immunity. However, the
federal government cannot tell the states in any manner how they should regulate their own people because that would be infringing on the states' reserved
sovereign power. Thus, in New York v. United States,2 56 Justice O'Connor
wrote for a 6-3 Court, including Justices Kennedy and Souter, that "Congress
may not simply 'commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.', 257 This
theory was extended in Printz v. United States.258 There a 5-4 Court held that
Congress could not require state officials to conduct a background check on
persons who had applied to purchase a gun.259 Relying on the structural arguments of the dual theory of sovereignty, history, and legislative and executive
practice, the Court concluded that just as Congress could not commandeer the
state legislature in New York, Congress cannot commandeer state executive or
administrative officials in Printz.
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The Court has made it clear that the New York and Printz cases apply
only where Congress attempts to "use" or "commandeer" state officials for federal purposes. These cases pose no Tenth Amendment limit on Congress's
power to regulate states or individuals directly.260 Thus, in Reno v. Condon,261 a
federal act barring unconsented disclosure of driver's license information was
applied to both the states and private persons. The Court stated that New York
and Printz did not apply where the federal exercise of Commerce Clause power
regulated state activities directly, rather than seeking to control or influence the
262
manner in which the states regulated private parties.. In Condon, since the
federal statute regulated state workers at the state's Department of Motor Vehicles, and did not tell those workers how to regulate their own citizens, the
federal act was constitutional. If the federal government attempted to tell states
how to regulate their own citizens, such as requiring individual driver's licenses
to contain certain information or be done in a standardized manner, that would
likely be viewed as commandeering.
Regarding direct regulation of individuals and states by the federal government, the modern broad power to regulate, consistent with the 1985 case of
Garcia and 2000 case of Condon, was held to exist by the Marshall Court in
263
1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden.
In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall noted that
"[t]he genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action
is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal
concerns which affect the states generally., 264 The phrase "internal concerns"
suggests a broad reading of "commerce" to include all kinds of economic activity. Further, Marshall noted that the term "commerce" in the Commerce Clause
also modified the phrases "with foreign nations" and "with the Indian tribes,"
and that it has been "universally admitted, that these words comprehend every
species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. 26 5 Marshall concluded, "[i]f this be the admitted meaning of the word, in
its application to foreign nations, it must carry the same meaning throughout the
sentence" and thus be equally applicable to commerce "among the several
States. 266
It has been argued that despite these passages, Marshall conceived of
commerce as not including economic activity other than buying and selling
goods, or transporting them to market, because Marshall indicated in Gibbons
that "[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as
well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which
260
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respect turnpike roads, ferries, [etc.,] are component parts of this mass" of subject-matters for state regulation.267 However, as Marshall made clear in Gibbons, while the federal government has "no direct general power over these objects," the "legislative power of the Union can reach them ...

for national pur-

poses," and the federal government "may use
268 means also employed by a State,
in the exercise of its acknowledged power.,
With respect to regulating commerce among the states, dealt with in
Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall wrote that "among" may be restricted to commerce
which concerns more states than one.269 However, Congress's power does not
stop at state lines. Although Congress's power does not reach the "exclusively
internal commerce" of the states, Marshall admitted, that concept is limited to
concerns completely within a particular state, which do not affect other states,
and with which Congress has not found it necessary to interfere for the purpose
of executing some of the general powers of the government. 270 Thus, Marshall
brought back into the federal realm what he appeared to take away by the phrase
"exclusively internal commerce." Particularly given integrated markets today,
very little commerce would not "affect other states" or, in particular circumstances, would it be true of that Congress would not find it "necessary" to act.
With respect to the power of states to enact laws that do not conflict
with an Act of Congress, Marshall held in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh
Co.271 that state laws enacted for the purpose of regulating their own purely internal affairs are constitutional, if not within a constitutional prohibition, unless
272
they conflict with an Act of Congress passed in pursuance of the Constitution.
As to what federal laws are within the Constitution, Marshall said in McCulloch
v. Maryland, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.",273 Means for executing the many great powers, such
as to levy taxes, borrow money, and regulate commerce, were not enumerated,
said Marshall, but were intended to be ample for executing the great powers. 274
Chief Justice Marshall and his Court thus interpreted the Constitution to
create a scheme of concurrent federal and state powers to pass laws on many
subjects, each government with power to seek its own legitimate purposes, with
federal law supreme in case of conflict. This scheme might have served well
267 Id. at 203. See Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Clause, 73 VA. L.
REV. 1387, 1405-08 (1987).
268 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203.
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even into the twenty-first century had not the Court in 1851 in Cooley v. Board
of Wardens275 departed from Marshall's reasoning by holding that the exercise
of a power was not to be defined by its purposes but, rather, by the nature of a
subject on which, as a means, the power operates. It was thus up to the Court,
not Congress, said Justice Curtis, to decide whether a subject was exclusively
for legislation by Congress, or exclusively for the states because the subject
required local diversity or was not a matter of interstate commerce, or whether
there was concurrent power. Thus, the Court planted a seed which was later to
grow into many limitations on Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause,
27
and from which the Nation was not freed until the mid-193 0S. 6
By then, the approach of Marshall in McCulloch and Gibbons was no
longer recalled and the Court turned to tests such as whether a subject of federal
legislation was substantially related to interstate commerce.27 Since the 1940s,
however, the Court has reached results consistent with the Marshall Court approach, and has upheld congressional power to regulate under the Commerce
Clause any economic activity with some connection to interstate economic activity, unless the subject matter of the regulation truly has no economic nexus,
and thus is truly a non-economic act. Thus, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States,278 the Court stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was constitutional,
because the activity it regulated - racial discrimination in terms of purchasing
rooms at hotels generally open to the public - was economic in nature and affected the movement of persons across state lines and, thus, the amount of money spent in interstate travel. 2 9 In Perez v. United States,280 a criminal law banning extortionate credit transactions was constitutional because of the affect of
275
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(holding that Congress could not regulate prices of a chicken slaughterhouse because the transactions occur after the chickens have come to rest and thus are intrastate); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that Congress could not pass child labor laws to prevent shipment in
interstate commerce of goods made by children who worked longer hours than permitted since the
evil occurred during the manufacturing process before the goods became articles of commerce)
and United States v. E.. Knight Co.. 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (Sherman Antitrust Act could not be
applied to a monopoly in manufacture because "[c]ommerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a
part of it.").
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extortionate credit, a crime involving money, on interstate organized crime. On
the other hand, in United States v. Morrison,281 a 5-4 Court held that a statute
regulating gender-motivated violence had no economic nexus, since the statute
was only targeted on violent action and, thus, was not a valid regulation of
commerce under the Commerce Clause. 282 Similarly, in Lopez v. United
States,283 a 5-4 Court held that mere possession of a gun in a school yard had no
economic nexus.2 84

In both Morrison and Lopez, Justice Kennedy was the critical fifth vote
for the majority opinion. However, Justice Kennedy made it clear in Lopez that
in his view Heart of Atlanta Motel and Perez were still good law.2 85 In both
Lopez and Morrison the Court's liberal instrumentalists, joined by Justice Souter, dissented, concluding that as long as the activity regulated could be thought
to have some effect on interstate commerce, whether the activity itself has an
economic component was irrelevant .286 Similarly, liberal instrumentalists have
not favored the New York and Printz limitations on Congress's power to regulate states under the natural law "dual theory of sovereignty. ' 287 The current
majority on the Supreme Court, however, favors the dual theory of sovereignty,
with Justice Kennedy being the critical fifth vote.
IV. CONCLUSION

Each of the five books addressed in this article consider from various
perspectives the role of judges in deciding cases, particularly cases involving
aspects of constitutional law. All of the authors - Judge Richard Posner, Justice Antonin Scalia and legal scholar Bryan Garner, Professor William Quirk,
Professor Daniel A. Farber, and Professor Edward A. Purcell, Jr. - are knowledgeable individuals with a felicity for engaging writing. However, like the
famous parable of five different individuals touching different parts of an elephant, and, thus, coming to different conclusions about what kind of animal they
were touching, each book suffers a bit from not placing its analysis firmly into a
broader theoretical perspective on different theories ofjudicial review.
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287 Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 939-40 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter. Ginsburg & Breyer. JJ.,
dissenting): New York, 505 U.S. 142, 201 02 (White, J.. joined by Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.,
concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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To summarize and conclude, there are four basic styles of judicial decision-making: formalism, Holmesian, instrumentalism, and natural law. With
regard to interpretation, whether common-law, statutory or constitutional interpretation, judges who are formalist (or legalist, or textualist) focus on contemporaneous sources of meaning - text, context, and history of a provision or common-law precedent - with a special focus on literal meaning. For constitutional law, this leads to a static, or fixed, view of the Constitution, primarily based
on the textual meaning at the time of ratification. Holmesian judges add to contemporaneous sources a judicial deference to later legislative, executive, and, to
some extent, social practice. Natural law judges add to these sources great respect for precedent and reasoned elaboration of the law. Instrumentalist (or
pragmatic, or purposivist) judges add a focus on prudential principles. For conservative instrumentalists, this typically involves greater weight paid to prudential principles of judicial restraint; for liberal instrumentalists, this typically involves greater weight paid to principles of justice or social policy embedded in
the law. Placed in this perspective, each of these five books makes a good contribution to legal scholarship once the predisposition of the author is understood:
Posner (conservative instrumentalist); Justice Scalia (formalist); Professor Quirk
(Holmesian); Professor Farber (natural law, with a hint of liberal instrumentalism), and Professor Purcell (liberal instrumentalist).
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